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ABSTRACT 
The paper will be focused on examining the debt relief options available for consumer 
debtors in South Africa. This paper will look at the relationship between the National Credit 
Act 34 of 2005 and the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. Further, it will examine the relationship 
between the provisions of section 74 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944. The paper 
will conclude by looking at debt relief options available for consumer debtors in the United 
States of America and in England and Wales and will make comparative comments and 
recommendations on how we can adopt some provisions into our own insolvency system. 
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‘The only man who sticks closer to you in adversity than a friend is a creditor’ 
Unknown 
 
1.1 Background  
Consumer insolvency and over-indebtedness are serious issues that affect most South African 
consumers. Therefore, it is imperative that our insolvency law is reformed appropriately in 
order to effectively address these issues. It is important, for a society like ours, to have a legal 
system which takes cognisance of the lived reality of consumer debtors in South Africa and 
the challenges they face. The South African legal system offers a variety of what may be 
regarded as ‘debt relief options’ for insolvent and over-indebted consumer debtors. These 
include sequestration, debt review and an administration order. Sequestration, which is 
provided for by the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 (hereafter referred to as ‘the Insolvency Act’ 
or ‘the Act’, where appropriate), regulates, amongst other things, the insolvency of natural 
persons. The other two debt relief options available are debt review, with possible debt 
rearrangement, provided for by the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (hereafter referred to as 
‘the NCA’), and administration orders, provided for by the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 
1944 (hereafter referred to as ‘the MCA’). Commentators have observed that the South 
African legislature has been slow in following the international trend of having a consumer 
insolvency system which balances appropriately the interests of both creditors and debtors.1  
All three of the abovementioned debt relief options apparently present either a procedural or 
substantive problem and, as a result, they have failed to offer consumer debtors adequate debt 
relief. The major shortcoming of debt relief by sequestration is the requirement of proof of 
‘advantage to creditors’ without which a court cannot consider exercising its discretion 
whether or not to grant a sequestration order.2 Therefore, it is not available as a debt relief 
option for debtors where it is not proved that sequestration of their estates would give rise to 
an advantage for their creditors. Thus, it may be said that ‘poor’ debtors, as opposed to 
‘affluent’ ones, who cannot access the sequestration mechanism provided by the Insolvency 
                                                          
1 Coetzee and Roestoff ‘Consumer debt relief in South Africa – should the insolvency system provide for NINA 
debtors? Lessons from New Zealand’ (2013) 22 International Insolvency Review 188-210,188. 
2 Boraine and Roestoff ‘Vriendskaplike sekwestrasies – ‘n produk van verouderde beginsels?’ (Deel 1) 1993 De 
Jure 229, 235-241. 
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Act due to lack of proof of ‘advantage to creditors’, will, as a consequence, forever be 
indebted to their creditors, with no prospect of rehabilitation in terms of the Insolvency Act 
and the resultant discharge from liability for pre-sequestration debt which it also provides.3  
 
A debtor, who cannot satisfy the stringent requirements of the Insolvency Act, is left with 
two other potential debt relief options, namely, debt review and rearrangement or an 
administration order, as mentioned above. However, these options also have inherent 
problems, which will be discussed below. The biggest challenge facing a debtor, who elects 
to utilise either of these debt relief options, is the fact that his estate is not protected from 
being sequestrated by his creditors. The provisions for debt review, contained in the NCA, do 
not bar a creditor from applying for the sequestration of the estate of a debtor who has 
applied for or is subject to debt review. Boraine and Roestoff have pointed out that this 
position in our law results in debtors being unable to choose how to deal with their financial 
dilemma.4 Concerns have been expressed that this does not conform to the international 
principles which advocate providing a debtor with the choice of a form of debt relief which 
poses an alternative to liquidation of his assets.5  
 
On the other hand, the NCA’s mechanisms for debt review and debt rearrangement require an 
over-burdened debtor to have some income from which to make regular payments in terms of 
a payment plan. Therefore, debtors with no income will not derive any benefit from debt 
review. The same may be said in respect of administration orders, in terms of the MCA. This 
accentuates the unfortunate position in our law that debtors in South Africa who are too poor 
to enter the insolvency regime via sequestration are left with no alternative recourse to debt 
relief. Therefore, legislative intervention is required in order to enact appropriate statutory 
provisions which will address the needs of debtors with no income and no assets. 
 
                                                          
3 S 127A of the Insolvency Act, See also Steyn, ‘Statutory regulation of the forced sale of home in South Africa’ 
LLD thesis, University of Pretoria 2012, 354. See also Boraine and Roestoff, ‘Revisiting the state of consumer 
insolvency in South Africa after 20 years: The court’s approach, international guidelines and an appeal for 
urgent law reform’ (Part 1) 2014 (77) THRHR 356, where it was noted that ‘the requirement of advantage to 
creditor is fundamental to the South African Insolvency Act and the Act actually places a stumbling block in a 
way of debtors wishing to use it as a form of debt relief. 
4 Boraine and Roestoff ‘The treatment of insolvency of natural persons in South African law: An appeal for a 
balanced and integrated approach’ in Hassane Cisse Fostering development through opportunity, inclusion and 
equity, The World Bank Legal Review, volume 5 (2014) 109 20. 
5 Steyn ‘Sink or Swim? Debt review’s ambivalent “lifeline” - A second sequel to “… a tale of two 
Judgments” Nedbank v Andrews and another (240/2011) [2011] ZAECPEHC 29 (10 May 2011); 
FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans 2011 4 597 (KZD) and FirstRand Bank Ltd v Janse van 2012 2 All SA 186 
(ECP)’ 2012 (15)4 PELJ 189, 217. 
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Commentators in this area have long maintained that the debt relief options in South Africa 
are inadequate and they therefore call for an overhaul of the consumer insolvency system.6 
Boraine and Van Heerden submitted that the legislator, when enacting new legislation, does 
not always consider its effects on existing legislation, with the result that it is left to the courts 
to consider its impact and application.7 The courts have been asked to pronounce on the effect 
of the provisions of the NCA and their interaction with the Insolvency Act in several cases 
and more recently in the case of FirstRand Bank v Kona and another.8 However, as will be 
submitted below, following specific discussion of these decisions, these judgments have not 
provided appropriate solutions to afford adequate debt relief options for consumer debtors in 
South Africa. In an attempt to resolve conflicts that emerged from these judgments, the 
legislature has recently introduced a new section 8A into the Insolvency Act.9 Section 8A 
provides that – ‘a debtor who has applied for a debt review must not be regarded as having 
committed an act of insolvency.’ This was one of the reasons that prompted the 
Constitutional Court to decline, in the recent case of De Klerk v Griekwaland Wes 
Korporatief Bpk10 (‘De Klerk’) to specifically address and resolve the issue. However, the 
wording of the new section 8A appears to be inadequate and there is doubt whether this 
section will be the solution as envisaged by the Constitutional Court in the case of De Klerk. 
 
Comparative study, including consumer insolvency and consumer credit laws of the United 
States of America and England and Wales, indicate that these countries adopt a more debtor-
friendly approach, providing more appropriate debt relief for individuals. It also suggests that 
South Africa’s consumer insolvency laws have not shifted to meet the internationally 
accepted standards of providing a system that balances the interests of creditors and debtors. 
In this paper, statutory mechanisms which potentially provide debt relief options for over-
burdened consumer debtors, as well as various associated problems, will be discussed. In 
light of debt relief options which are available in the United States of America and England 
and Wales, consideration will be given to whether the South African legislature should adopt 
any similar mechanisms into our system. 
                                                          
6 Boraine and Roestoff (note 4 above) 24. 
7 Boraine and Van Heerden ‘To sequestrate or not to sequestrate in view of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005: 
A tale of two judgments’ 2010 (13) PELJ 84 -508, 85. 
8 FirstRand Bank v Kona and another 2003/2014 [2015] ZSCA 11; Ex parte Ford and two similar cases 2009 
(3) SA 376; Investec Bank Ltd and Another v Mutemeri 2010 (1) SA 265 (GSJ); Naidoo v ABSA Bank Ltd 2010 
(4) SA 597 (SCA); FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evan 2011 (4) SA 597 (KZD) and FirstRand Bank Ltd v Janse van 
Rensburg [2012] 2 All SA 186. 
9 This was section 38 of, read with the schedule to, the National Credit Amendment Act 19 of 2014. 
10 (CCT 187/13) [2014 ZACC 20] (19 June 2014). 
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1.2 Research Statement 
The increased ease of access to credit has led to increased over-indebtedness, however, the 
current South African legal system appears to lack adequate debt relief options to address this 
concerning issue of over-indebtedness.11 Therefore, there appears to be need for a system of 
law that will provide effective debt relief options for consumer debtors who find themselves 
in financial difficulties.12 One way in which this can be achieved is by enacting legislation 
which will balance both the interests of creditors and debtors and by doing so provide 
adequate debt relief options for over-indebted consumers. 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
This paper seeks to address and answer the following questions. 
 Does South Africa’s legal system offer adequate debt relief options for its insolvent 
consumer debtors? 
 What are the current debt relief options and the issues associated with each? 
 How have other jurisdictions, particularly the United States of America and England 
and Wales addressed this issue?  
 What, from these jurisdictions, might be adopted and incorporated in our system? 
 
1.4 Research objectives 
The objectives of this paper are to consider the various debt relief options available to 
individual debtors in South Africa and the problems associated with them. Further, the aim is 
to compare statutory provisions applicable in selected foreign jurisdictions with a view to 
making recommendations regarding possible legislative reform in South Africa. 
 
1.5 Delineations and limitations 
It will not be feasible in such a short dissertation to present any in depth analysis of the law, 
and its application, regulating sequestration, debt review and re-arrangement and 
administration orders. Discussion of each will therefore be restricted to basic principles 
pertaining to them and to selected aspects, and problems arising in respect, of each, as 
appropriate, given the objectives of this paper.  
 
                                                          
11 Boraine and Roestoff (note 4 above) 2. 
12 Steyn (note above 5) 220. 
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1.6 Terminology 
For the sake of convenience, unless specifically indicated otherwise, ‘he’ will be used to 
reflect ‘he or she’ and ‘his’ will be used to reflect ‘his or her’. In this dissertation, particularly 
in the discussion of the law in foreign jurisdictions, the terms ‘insolvency’ and ‘bankruptcy’ 
will be used interchangeably.13 In relation to the NCA ‘debt re-arrangement’ and ‘debt 
restructuring’ are used interchangeably.14 
 
1.7 Overview of chapters  
This dissertation is divided into seven chapters, including this introductory chapter. Chapter 2 
discusses sequestration, in terms of the Insolvency Act, and identifies certain problems 
associated with sequestration of a debtor’s estate as a form of debt relief. Chapter 3 focuses 
on administration orders and the associated problems. Chapter 4 discusses the NCA and some 
problematic issues which have arisen in relation to debt review and debt re-arrangement. 
Chapter 5 outlines the interface between sequestration, provided for by the Insolvency Act, 
and provisions regulating debt review and debt re-arrangement, contained in the NCA. 
Chapter 6 consists of a comparative study aimed at identifying statutory provisions in other 
jurisdictions which might appropriately be adopted in South Africa to reform our consumer 
insolvency legal system. Chapter 7 contains conclusions and recommendations in support of 












                                                          
13 Fletcher, Law of Insolvency 4th edition (2009) Sweet and Maxwell 6-7. 
14 Vessio, ‘Beware of the provider of reckless credit’2009 TSAR 274-289, 284. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
SEQUESTRATION IN TERMS OF THE INSOLVENCY ACT 24 OF 1936 
 
2.1 General 
South African insolvency law is regulated mainly by the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 and, 
where the Act is silent on an issue and no other statute specifically applies, by the common 
law. The Insolvency Act does not define the term insolvency; it is only in case law that we 
find this definition. The test for insolvency, established in Venter v Venter, is ‘whether the 
debtor’s liabilities fairly estimated exceed his assets fairly valued.’15  
 
South African insolvency law is neither Roman Dutch, nor purely English, law, its legal 
tradition having been influenced, both in substance and methodology, during the periods of 
Dutch and British colonial domination in the Cape of Good Hope.16  The South African Law 
Reform Commission (hereafter referred to as ‘the Commission’), as early as the late 1980s, 
embarked on an extensive review of South African insolvency law which ultimately led to a 
recommendation for the substitution of the Insolvency Act with a proposed unified Act.17 It 
has been stated that it is clear, from the changes and recommendations proposed by the 
Commission, that no substantial policy-driven or empirical investigation in respect of 
regulation of South African insolvency law had been undertaken before then. Further, the 
Commission’s recommendations have not yet been implemented and, as a result, the South 
African law regulating the position, as regards the insolvency of natural persons, has 
remained largely unchanged since 1936.18 
 
For a proper understanding of the concept of sequestration as a potential form of debt relief 
for an insolvent person, it is useful to appreciate the philosophy behind the South African law 
of insolvency and it is necessary to know the basic principles underlying the rights of debtors 
and creditors in South Africa in general.19 When a debtor is unable to fulfil his obligations, 
                                                          
15 1973 (3) SA 175(T) 179. 
16 Calitz ‘Historical overview of state regulation of South African insolvency law’ (2010) 16 (2) Fundamina 1-
27, 1. 
17 Calitz (note 16 above) 1. 
18 Calitz (note 16 above) 1. See also Evans ‘The abuse of the process of the court in friendly sequestration 
proceedings in South Africa, International Insolvency Review, volume 11 (2002) 13-34, 31. See also Boraine 
and Roestoff 2014 THRHR (note 3 above) 352, where they state that South Africa still has an Insolvency Act 
that hails from 1936, which has not moved with the times and still remains pro creditor where only the 
privileged debtors, who are able to prove ‘advantage to creditors’ will be entitled to rehabilitation.   
19  E Bertelsmann et al Mars, The Law of Insolvency in South Africa 9th edition (2008) Juta & Co 1. 
 7  
  
various procedures are available to both the debtor and creditors.20 These procedures include 
a creditor demanding payment, issuing summons and obtaining a civil judgment against the 
debtor, issued through the official court process applicable to debt enforcement.21 A civil 
judgment would make it possible for the judgment creditor to execute against the assets of the 
debtor in order to obtain satisfaction of the judgment debt. It would also be open to the debtor 
himself voluntarily to surrender his estate by bringing an application to the high court,22 in 
terms of the Insolvency Act, for the issue of a sequestration order, the consequence of which 
would be the liquidation of all of his non-exempt assets and the distribution of the proceeds to 
his creditors in accordance with the provisions of the Insolvency Act. On the other hand, one 
or more of the creditors may apply to the high court, in terms of the Insolvency Act, to have 
the debtor’s estate sequestrated.23 
 
One of the consequences of sequestration is that it precludes creditors from bringing, or 
continuing, any action against the insolvent to enforce the payment of debts. Another is that, 
ultimately, rehabilitation of the insolvent gives rise to a discharge for him of liability for all 
pre-sequestration debt. In these respects, sequestration may be regarded, from the perspective 
of the debtor, as a debt relief mechanism. However, it should be borne in mind that, when the 
Insolvency Act was enacted, in 1936, the primary intention of the legislature was not to 
devise a debt relief mechanism for the benefit of the debtor, but the main theme which runs 
through the Act is one aimed at ensuring the greatest pecuniary advantage for creditors.24 
Further, even when these requirements have been met, the granting of the order remains in 
the discretion of the court.25 
 
It is for these reasons that South Africa’s personal insolvency law is known for its strongly 
creditor-oriented approach as opposed to the insolvency laws of countries such as England 
and the United States of America which have a more debtor- friendly approach.26  
                                                          
20 Mars, The Law of Insolvency (note 19 above) 1. 
21 Where the debt arose out of a credit agreement, the provisions of the NCA will also have to be complied with. 
22 It is only a high court that can make a sequestration order as this affects a person's status. 
23 Mars, The Law of Insolvency (note 19 above) 16-17; Calitz (note 16 above) 13. 
24 Smith, ‘The Recurrent Motif of the Insolvency Act – Advantage for creditors’ (1985) 7 Modern Business Law 
27. 
25 See ss 6, 10 and 12 of the Insolvency Act. 
26 Roestoff and Coetzee ‘Consumer Debt Relief in SA; Lessons from America and England; and suggestions for 
the way forward’ (2012) 24 Merc LJ 53-76, 54. See also Evans, ‘A brief explanation of consumer bankruptcy 
and aspects of the bankruptcy estate in the United States of America’ 2010 XLIII CILSA 337-351,337. 
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In this chapter, pertinent aspects of the procedure by which a debtor’s estate may be 
sequestrated in terms of the Insolvency Act, i.e., by voluntary surrender or by compulsory 
sequestration, will be discussed briefly, as well as the requirements for a sequestration order 
to be issued and some of the consequences of sequestration. It will also identify and briefly 
discuss problems which arise within the context of the conception of sequestration as a 
potential means by which a debtor may obtain debt relief.       
   
2.2 Sequestration: procedure; requirements and related issues  
2.2.1 Two procedures: voluntary surrender and compulsory sequestration 
Sequestration applications may be brought in the high court either by the debtor on an ex 
parte basis through voluntary surrender, or by way of compulsory sequestration in an 
application with prior notice by a creditor.27  
 
Section 6 of the Insolvency Act provides that in a voluntary surrender the debtor must satisfy 
the court that: 
a.  he has complied with all the statutory formalities required in section 4 of the Act; 
b.  he is factually insolvent; 
c.  sequestration will be to the advantage of creditors; and 
d.  the free residue is sufficient to cover the costs of sequestration.28    
 
In Ex Parte Bergh,29 Centlivres J stated that ‘the two major requirements in a voluntary 
surrender are that there must be sufficient reasonable assets to defray the costs of 
sequestration and that the surrender will be to the advantage of creditors.’30 Therefore, if 
there are insufficient assets to pay all of the costs of sequestration, out of the realisable 
property, the court cannot accept the surrender.31 It may also be noted that, even where the 
requirements have been met, the court has the discretion whether to grant or refuse the 
sequestration order.32  
 
On the other hand, for compulsory sequestration, the applicant creditor must show that: 
                                                          
27 Ss 3, 6, 10 and 12 of the Insolvency Act. See also Mars (note 19 above) 1. 
28 S 6 of the Insolvency Act. 
29 1928 OPD 220 132. 
30 Ex parte Bergh 132. 
31 Ex parte Bergh 132. 
32 S 6 (1) of the Insolvency Act. 
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a. he has established a claim which entitles him, in terms of section 9(1), to apply for 
sequestration of the debtor's estate; 
b. he has a liquidated claim of at least R100 or, where more creditors with separate 
claims apply jointly, that the total of their claims in aggregate is not less than R200; 
c. the debtor is actually insolvent or has committed an act of insolvency; and 
d. there is reason to believe that sequestration will be to the advantage of creditors.33 
For a creditor to succeed in a compulsory sequestration, he must obtain a provisional and a 
final sequestration order. At the initial stage, the applicant creditor must establish evidence 
which leads the court to form the opinion that prima facie the abovementioned requirements 
have been met and, if they are, the court has the discretion to make an order sequestrating the 
estate of the debtor provisionally.34 Before the court may grant a final order of sequestration, 
it must be satisfied as to the above requirements.35 Even where the requirements are met, the 
court has the discretion whether or not to grant a final order of sequestration.  
 
2.2.2 Advantage to creditors  
The Insolvency Act requires proof that sequestration will be to the ‘advantage of creditors’ 
and yet it does not provide a definition for this phrase. It has been left to the judiciary to 
interpret it and to provide the meaning of it, which, as it appears, is not clear cut. In Hillhouse 
v Stott; Freban Investments (Pty) Ltd v Itzkin; Botha v Botha (‘Hillhouse’),36 the court held 
that every case must be judged on its own facts and the discretion of the court to judge each 
case on such facts must remain unfettered.37 According to the cases, and as pointed out by 
Boraine and Van Heerden, in deciding whether the advantage to creditors requirement is met, 
the inquiry is whether a substantial portion of the creditors, which is determined according to 
the value of their claims, will derive advantage from sequestration.38 It is required that 
sequestration at least yields a non-negligible dividend.39 If, after the costs of sequestration 
                                                          
33 Ss 10 and 12 of the Insolvency Act. 
34 S 10 of the Insolvency Act. 
35 S 12 of the Insolvency Act; Amod v Khan 1974 (1) SA 150. 
36 1990 (4) SA 580 (W).   
37 Hillhouse v Scott. See also Van Heerden and Boraine ‘The interaction between the debt relief measures in the 
National Credit Act 34 of 2005 and aspects of Insolvency Law’ (2009) 12 (3) PELJ 22-161, where they state 
that one would nevertheless hope that, when exercising their discretion in sequestration applications, courts will 
follow a common-sense approach by considering the best possible solution in every instance. 
38 Boraine and Van Heerden (note 7 above) 89. 
39 Boraine and Van Heerden (note 7 above) 89. 
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have been met, there would be no, or only a negligible, payment to creditors, such advantage 
is not present.40  
 
Despite courts consistently having been reluctant to stipulate a minimum anticipated dividend 
to be required,41 more recently, in Ex Parte Ogunlaja and others (‘Ogunlaja’),42 a 
prospective dividend of 20 cents in the rand was regarded as the minimum benefit that would 
have to be established before an application for surrender of an estate or for compulsory 
sequestration would be granted.43 In Ex Parte Cloete,44 the Free State High Court took the 
view that it should follow the guidelines laid down by the North Gauteng High Court in this 
regard.45 
 
Because, in cases of compulsory sequestration, the applicant creditor often lacks access to 
information regarding the debtor's financial position, as indicated above,46 a lesser onus is 
placed on the creditor.47 In Meskin & Co v Friedman (‘Meskin’),48 Roper J stated that ‘the 
phrase ‘reason to believe’, used as it is in both these sections (sections 10 and 12 of the 
Insolvency Act), indicates that it is not necessary, either at the first or at the final hearing, for 
the creditor to induce in the mind of the court a positive view that sequestration will be to the 
financial advantage of creditors’.49 As was held in Meskin the facts put before the court must 
satisfy it that there is a reasonable prospect, not necessarily likelihood, but a prospect which 
is not too remote that some pecuniary benefit will result to creditors.50 Further, courts have 
held that it is not necessary to prove that the insolvent has any assets but the fact that there 
are reasons for thinking that as a result of an enquiry under the Act, some may be revealed or 
recovered for the benefit of the creditors is sufficient.51 
 
                                                          
40 Boraine and Van Heerden (note 7 above) 89. See also Van Heerden and  Boraine, (note 37) 88, where they 
submitted that ‘an advantage to creditors is about more than just a monetary dividend and is essentially a de 
facto test that has to be determined with reference to the peculiar circumstances of each case’. 
41 1996 (1) SA 935 (C). 
42 2011 JOL 27029 (GNP). 
43 Ex parte Ogunalaja par 23. 
44 (1097/2013) [2013] ZAFSHC 45 (5 April 2013). 
45 Ex parte Cloete par 23. 
46 See 2.2.1 for the requirements for compulsory sequestration. 
47 Boraine and Van Heerden (note 7 above) 114. 
48 1948 (2) SA 555 (W) 559.  
49 Meskin par 558. 
50 Meskin par 559. 
51 Meskin par 559. 
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In Ex parte Shmukler-Tshiko and others52 (‘Shmukler’) the court noted that the administration 
costs of the applications reduced the amount available for distribution amongst concurrent 
creditors and, as a result, undermined the purpose of a sequestration, which is that it should 
be to the advantage of creditors.53 Further, the court noted that, more often than not, the costs 
of sequestration exceeded the amount available to concurrent creditors and consequently it 
appeared that the sequestration advantaged administrators rather than creditors.54 The court 
held that it was trite law that an advantage to creditors was a broad concept ranging from 
‘non-negligible pecuniary benefit’ through to an enquiry into a debtor’s financial affairs. The 
court also warned that an act of insolvency was insufficient reason on its own for the belief 
that the sequestration of the debtor’s estate will be to creditors’ advantage.55 
 
In light of the above requirements, it is clear that there is a greater burden of proof required in 
a voluntary surrender than for compulsory sequestration. The degree of proving advantage to 
creditors in compulsory sequestration is lighter due to the wording of sections 10 (c) and 12 
(1) (c) as compared with that in section 6.56  
 
2.2.3 ‘Acts of insolvency’ 
A creditor may have good reason for believing that a debtor is insolvent but may not be in a 
position to prove it.57 The legislature catered for this by designating, in section 8 of the 
Insolvency Act, certain acts or omissions by a debtor as ‘acts of insolvency’. As indicated 
above,58 if the creditor, in an application for compulsory sequestration, can establish that the 
debtor has committed one or more of these ‘acts’ he may be able to apply for, and obtain, a 
sequestration order without proving actual insolvency on the part of the debtor.59 
 
Of particular relevance to this paper is the act of insolvency created by section 8 (g), which 
provides that a debtor commits an act of insolvency if he gives notice in writing to any one of 
his creditors that he is unable to pay any of his debts.60 The notice must convey inability to 
pay as opposed to mere unwillingness to pay. The test applied, to determine whether this act 
                                                          
52 2012 SA (GSJ) decided 26 October 2012. 
53 Shmukler par 31. 
54 Shmukler par 32. 
55 Shmukler par 59. 
56 S 6, 10 and 12 of the Insolvency Act. 
57 Sharrock, Smith and Van Der Linde, Hockly’s Insolvency Law 9th edition (2012) Juta & Co 26. 
58 See 2.2.2, above. 
59 Sharrock, Hockly’s (note 57 above) 26. 
60 See further 5.2.2 below.  
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of insolvency has been committed, is whether a reasonable person in the position of the 
receiver of the document, and with the same knowledge of the relevant circumstances, would 
have interpreted the document in question to mean that the debtor cannot pay his debts.61        
  
2.2.4 Friendly sequestration 
Creditors frequently rely on the commission by a debtor of an ‘act of insolvency’ in 
applications for compulsory sequestration commonly referred to as ‘friendly sequestration’, 
usually motivated by the debtor’s desire to put an end to his financial woes.62 In Klemrock 
(Pty) Ltd v De Klerk and another (‘Klemrock’),63 Nicholas J referred to the term ‘friendly 
sequestration’ as meaning that the debtor is anxious to be sequestrated.64 One of the reasons 
for the existence of the so-called friendly sequestration is the result of a heavier burden of 
proof which rests on the applicant in voluntary surrender, to prove advantage to creditors.65 
Frequently, a sympathetic creditor will come to the assistance of a debtor by applying for the 
compulsory sequestration of the debtor’s estate.66    
 
In Craggs v Dedekind, Baartman v Baartman and another, Van Jaarsveld v Roebuck, Van 
Aardt v Barrett (‘Craggs v Dedekind’),67 the court held that friendly sequestrations are 
viewed with suspicion by courts for various reasons, including the fact that most often than 
not, the petitioning creditor and the debtors are related and that they are often resorted to in 
an attempt to abuse the court process.68 In the result, where the application is brought by a 
party who does not appear to be acting at arm’s length, but more in a ‘friendly capacity’, with 
the debtor’s interests, more than those of the creditors, in mind, the court will pay special 
attention to whether there is reason to believe that sequestration will be to the advantage of 
creditors in the particular circumstances.69 If this is not the case, the application for 
sequestration should be refused. 
 
                                                          
61 See 1995 (3) SA 123 (A). 
62 Mars, The Law of Insolvency (note 19) 98.  
63 1973(3) SA 925(W). 
64 Klemrock par 927, See also Evans, ‘The abuse of the process of the court in friendly sequestration 
proceedings in South Africa’ (note 18 above), the term ‘friendly sequestration’ generally implies that the 
sequestrating creditor is well acquainted with the debtor, and that the main object of that creditor is to come to 
the debtor’s assistance.  
65 2009 (3) SA 376 par 9. 
66 Ex parte Ford par 15. 
67 1996 (1) SA 935 par 935. 
68 Craggs v Dedekind par 937. 
69 Craggs v Dedekind par 927. 
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Evans made an important observation in relation to friendly sequestration applications that 
the element which is mostly not present in these cases is that of ‘advantage to creditors’.70 
Further, Evans expressed concerns about the amendment to the Act did not include provisions 
to improve on the position regarding friendly sequestration and saw this as a shortcoming on 
the part of the legislature.71 He proposed that the amendments to the Act should have 
contained provisions conferring a judicial discretion to require debtors in friendly 
sequestration proceedings to comply with the same or similar provisions that are required for 
the voluntary surrender of the debtor’s estate.72 
 
Problematic issues which have arisen, within the context of a conception of sequestration as a 
debt relief option, in various cases concerning compulsory sequestration, including ‘friendly 
sequestration’, will be discussed further, below.73  
 
2.3 Consequences of sequestration 
2.3.1 Vesting of assets 
The function of the trustee is to collect the assets in the estate, realise them, and distribute the 
proceeds amongst creditors in the order of preference laid down by the Insolvency Act.74 To 
this end, the Act provides that the effect of a sequestration order, including a provisional 
order, is to divest the estate of the insolvent and vest it in the Master and thereafter in the 
trustee upon his appointment.75 The estate remains vested with the trustee, until the court 
discharges the sequestration order, or the creditors accept an offer of composition made by 
the insolvent which provides that the insolvent’s property will be restored to him, or an order 
for the insolvent’s rehabilitation has been granted in terms of section 124 (3).76 
 
2.3.2 Rehabilitation and discharge from liability for pre-sequestration debt  
An insolvent debtor whose estate has been sequestrated may apply by ex parte application to 
the high court for rehabilitation.77 In terms of the Insolvency Act, an insolvent who has not 
been rehabilitated by the court within ten years from the date of sequestration of his estate, is 
                                                          
70 Evans, ‘Unfriendly consequences of a friendly sequestration’ 2003 (15) SA Merc LJ 437-447, 444. 
71 Evans, (note 70 above) 444. 
72 Evans (note 70 above) 444. 
73 See 2.4 below. 
74 Sharrock, Hockly’s (note 57 above) 48. 
75 Sharrock   Hockly’s (note 57 above) 48. 
76 Sharrock Hockly’s (note 57 above) 48. 
77 Mars, The Law of Insolvency (note 19 above) 555. 
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automatically rehabilitated subject to the proviso, contained in section 127A (1) of the Act, 
that an interested person may apply to the high court, prior to expiry of the ten-year period, to 
order otherwise.78 An insolvent does not have a right to be rehabilitated; it is a matter within 
the discretion of the court.79 All the debtor’s pre-sequestration debts are discharged upon 
rehabilitation. 
 
2.4 Shortcomings of sequestration as a debt relief option 
A relatively recent, pertinent, leading case, which illustrates the problems that arise where 
debtors wish to utilise voluntary surrender as a form of debt relief, is Ex parte Ford. In this 
case, the court dealt with three applications for voluntary surrender of the estates of three 
debtors.80 The applicants’ liabilities consisted of debts owed to financial institutions or 
money lenders, either by way of loans on overdraft or otherwise, or as a consequence of the 
extension of credit through credit-card facilities.81 Therefore, all the debts of the applicants 
resulted from ‘credit agreements’ as defined by the NCA. The applicants argued that: they 
became insolvent without any fraud or dishonesty on their part; utilising the NCA’s debt 
review and debt re-arrangement mechanisms was not ideal in their circumstances; and, thus, 
applying for the voluntary surrender of their estate was more appropriate.82 The Act states 
that an applicant for voluntary surrender must also satisfy the court that the acceptance of the 
surrender of the estate in question will be to the advantage of creditors.83 
 
Therefore, the court held that it was not disposed to exercise its discretion in favour of 
granting their applications for voluntary surrender. The court also rejected the applicants’ 
counsel’s argument that they were entitled to choose the form of relief that suited their 
convenience, by virtue of satisfying the relevant statutory requirements under the Insolvency 
Act. The court held that such approach was misdirected especially where the grant of the 
selected remedy is discretionary.84 The court’s reasoning in Ex Parte Ford is discussed in 
more detail at 5.2.1. 
 
                                                          
78 Sharrock, Hockly’s (note 57 above) 147. 
79 Sharrock, Hockly’s (note 57 above) 147. 
80 Ex parte Ford par 2. 
81 Ex parte Ford par 2. 
82 Ex parte Ford par 2. 
83 S 6 of the Insolvency Act. 
84 FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans 2011 (4) SA 597 par 19. 
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Another recent case, which highlights problems associated with debtors resorting to voluntary 
surrender as means of seeking debt relief, is Ex parte Cloete85 The applicant debtor owed a 
bank an amount of R170 560.55 arising from four separate debts, three being in respect of 
loans of money and a fourth based on vehicle finance provided to purchase a vehicle, valued 
at R130 000, which was the only asset of the debtor.86  The applicant was an engine driver 
and had lost his job in 2009 and was unemployed for a certain period of time, thereafter 
obtained employment but at a much lower salary.87 The applicant sold all his assets except his 
motor vehicle. He further applied for debt review but could no longer afford to make the 
agreed monthly payments.88  
 
The court reiterated that the substantive requirements were that the applicant must be 
insolvent; the applicant must own realizable property of a sufficient value to defray all costs 
of sequestration; and that the sequestration will be to the advantage of the applicant’s 
creditors.89 The court pointed out that the test to establish that it is to the advantage of 
creditors for the estate to be sequestrated is more stringent in cases of voluntary surrender 
than in compulsory sequestration applications.90 The court also observed a recent trend to 
launch applications for acceptance of the surrender of debtors’ estates, as is the case with so 
called ‘friendly sequestrations’,91 the main purpose being the advantage of debtors, but which 
unfortunately brought with it disadvantages for creditors. The court stated that this could not 
be what the legislature had in mind.92 The court also cautioned that various courts in South 
Africa have warned over the years against abuse of process pertaining to friendly 
sequestrations as well as application for voluntary surrender. The court was of the view that it 
must also add its voice and try to prevent debtors from abusing the system to the detriment of 
creditors.93 The court found support for its approach in a quotation from the judgment of 
Holmes J, in Ex parte Pillay; Mayet v Pillay (‘Pillay’),94 that ‘the machinery of voluntary 
                                                          
85(1097/2013) 2013 ZAFSHC 45 (5 April 2013). 
86 Ex parte Cloete par 3. Presumably, the vehicle was still owned by the credit provider, according to standard 
practice adopted in respect of financial loans. 
87 Ex parte Cloete par 3. 
88 Ex parte Cloete par 3. 
89 Ex parte Cloete par 7. 
90 Ex parte Cloete par 8. 
91 For discussion of friendly sequestration, see 2.2.4 above. 
92 Ex parte Cloete par 10. 
93 Ex parte Cloete par 13. 
94 1955 (2) SA 309 (N). 
 16  
  
surrender was primarily designed for the benefit of creditors, and not for the relief of harassed 
debtors.’95 
 
The court also noted that most friendly sequestration applications often raised doubts as to the 
relationship between the attorney, valuator or between the debtor and valuator. In the present 
case, the court was concerned that the relationship between the valuator, attorney and 
applicant ‘raised eyebrows’.96 Therefore the court agreed with the decision in Ex Parte 
Arntzen97 that voluntary surrender required an even higher level of disclosure than friendly 
sequestration and it was appropriate to require compliance with the guidelines set out in 
Mthimkhulu v Rampersad (‘Mthimkhulu’).98 
In respect of the issue of advantage to creditors, the court stated that previously, in voluntary 
surrender and friendly sequestration, once it was established that a dividend of 10c in the rand 
would be payable to concurrent creditors, an advantage to creditors would have been proved. 
However, the court was of the view that an advantage to creditors required a dividend of 20c 
in the rand. In Ex parte Ogunlaja and others99 the court also took the view that 10c in the 
rand was insufficient and a dividend of 20c in the rand is regarded as the minimum benefit 
that would have to be established before a voluntary surrender or compulsory sequestration 
application is granted.100 The court held that the applicant’s failure to disclose his income and 
expenditure was highly relevant insofar as the total of the concurrent claims was relatively 
small. If the income expenditure was fully disclosed, it might have had an effect on 
considerations pertaining to the advantage to creditors.101  
The court concluded that the application should be dismissed for not fulfilling the 
requirements of section 6 of the Insolvency Act, further the court stated that it will not 
consider whether the non-compliance would have been condoned in a suitable case. The court 
dismissed the application on the basis that it was not satisfied that the advantage to creditors 
had been shown to exist.102 The court held that the case was a typical situation where the 
applicant should have utilised that provisions of the NCA in order to deal with his financial 
                                                          
95 Ex parte Pillay par 311. 
96 Ex parte Cloete par 15. 
97 2013 (1) SA 49 (KZP). 
98 2002 (3) SA 512 (N). 
99 2011 JOL 27029. 
100 Ex parte Cloete par 23. 
101 Ex parte Cloete par 25. 
102 Ex parte Cloete par 30. 
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problems. In this way he would have been protected against harassment from creditors who 
on the other hand, would have eventually received full payment of their claims.103 The court 
advised that all debtors, especially those with small and medium sized estates, should as a 
starting point embraces the protection of the NCA if the claim fell within the scope of the 
Act.104 The court held that insolvency must always be the last resort and as a general rule it 
was not acceptable that debtors used the machinery of the Insolvency Act to get rid of the 
creditors.105 
As far as concerns compulsory sequestration, especially in friendly sequestration 
applications, in which, essentially, the parties seek debt relief for the debtor, as opposed to 
securing financial advantage for the creditors, a number of reported judgments expose the 
limitations, in this regard, inherent in the South African insolvency law mechanisms. In 
Epstein v Epstein (‘Epstein’)106 the debtor’s mother applied for the sequestration of her son’s 
estate on the basis of a letter which he had written informing her that he could not repay to 
her a loan which she had extended to him. In the circumstances, the court found that 
sequestration held no advantage for creditors and that the application had been brought 
primarily to avoid civil imprisonment for unpaid debts.107 Seligson AJ stated that ‘the Court 
should not readily encourage the avoidance of the statutory safeguards for creditors by 
sanctioning recourse to a friendly sequestration via the easy route of s[ection] 8 (g) of the 
Act, unless it is clear that the general body of creditors will benefit.’108 
In Craggs v Dedekind the court also dealt with four different friendly sequestration 
applications. In one application the petitioner had lent the first respondent R1000 in January 
1995 to pay some of his debts.109 The loan repayment was said to have been outstanding 
since March 2005.  The court noted that the fact that this was a friendly sequestration was 
evidenced by the small amount that was claimed and the fact that he chose sequestration 
where he could have sued his debtor in a small claims court.110 In another application the 
petitioner had lent the respondent R20 000 since his business was doing badly and in need of 
working capital.111   
                                                          
103 Ex parte Cloete par 27. 
104 Ex parte Cloete par 24. 
105  Ex parte Cloete par 24. 
106 1987 (4) SA 206 (C). 
107 Sharrock, Hockly’s (note 57 above) 33. 
108 Sharrock, Hockly’s (note 57 above) 33. 
109 Craggs v Dedekind par 938. 
110 Craggs v Dedekind par 938. 
111 Craggs v Dedekind  par 938 
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At the outset the court stated that friendly sequestrations shared certain characteristics. The 
debt which the sequestrating creditor relies upon is almost always a loan, usually a small loan 
without security of any sort.112 Further the agreement is usually not reduced to writing and 
the only writing that is produced to the court is the letter stating that the debt cannot be 
paid.113 Sometimes the details of the respondent’s assets and liabilities will be set out.114 The 
court also noted that in friendly sequestrations the debtor and the creditor are often related in 
that fathers sequestrate sons, wives sequestrate husbands and sweethearts sequestrate each 
other with no potential damage on their relationship.115 
 
In light of these factors the court cautioned that a court should be on its guard when the signs 
are there. Further the court held that courts should be forgiven for requiring rather more from 
a friendly petitioner than it might otherwise do and that, consequently a friendly petitioner 
must present sufficiently detailed evidence to satisfy a sceptical court that he indeed has a 
claim against the respondent.116 
 
In Mthimkhulu, the court observed that the facts of the case illustrated the manner in which 
the process of friendly sequestration had been abused and continues to be abused.117 The 
court then set out the minimum requirements for an application for the sequestration of a 
debtor’s estate by a friendly creditor. The requirements read as follows:  
(i) sufficient proof of the applicant’s locus standi;  
(ii) sufficient documentary proof of the debt; 
(iii) reasons should be given for the fact that the applicant had no security for the debt;  
(iv)      a full and complete list of the respondent’s assets and acceptable evidence upon    
which the court could determine their true market value;  
(v)       in case of immovable property, the valuer should prove his or her qualifications to 
make the valuation and give  details of his or her experience;  
(vi) notice of the application should be given to the bondholder; and 
                                                          
112 Craggs v Dedekind par 937. 
113 Craggs v Dedekind par 937. 
114 Craggs v Dedekind par 937. 
115 Craggs v Dedekind par 937. 
116 Craggs v Dedekind par 937. 
117 Mthimkhulu par 515. 
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(vii) full and acceptable reasons on affidavits should be given for an application for the 
execution of a provisional order.118 
 
More recently, in Plumb on Plumbers v Lauderdale and another (‘Plumb on Plumbers’),119 
the court referred to Mthimkhulu. In this case the court noted that, in the application papers, 
that some of the allegations of fact in the founding affidavit matched with those of a previous 
application that had come before the court.120 Further, it appeared to the court that the 
sequestration applications were coming from the same office of attorneys. The suspicion was 
highlighted by the fact that, in many of the applications, proof of service of the provisional 
order was by way of an affidavit from the debtor who had been provisionally sequestrated. 
After carefully considering these facts and noting the similarities in this case with previous 
applications that came before it, it held that, as stated in Mthimkhulu, the facts of the case 
illustrated a manner in which the process of the friendly sequestration has been abused and 
continued to be abused. 121 
 
Another serious shortcoming of the insolvency system is South Africa is the ‘advantage to 
creditors’ requirement which has been subjected to a great deal of criticism. A debtor who 
cannot prove this requirement is left without a formal remedy providing debt relief as well as 
discharge from liability.122 Meskin submitted that, in the circumstances where a debtor is 
unable pay his debts, wholly or in part, and he seeks to escape commercial harassment, it 
really should be irrelevant whether he has property and, if he has such, what it will contribute 
towards the meeting of costs and claims of creditors.123 Meskin suggested that ‘[t]he 
justification for sequestration should be seen in the very fact that its institution will enable the 
process of administration in insolvency to ensue, which will determine whether property 
exists or can be recovered, from which costs of claims can be met.’124 
 
                                                          
118 Mthimkhulu par 515. 
119 2013 (1) SA 60 (KZD). 
120 Plumb on Plumbers par 2. 
121 Plumb on Plumbers par 8. See also Mabe and Evans, ‘Abuse of sequestration proceedings in South Africa 
revisited’(2014) 26 SA Merc LJ 652, where it was noted that it has been pointed out that dishonesty in 
insolvency proceedings places a burden on creditors and the economy in general. 
122 Ex parte Ford par 23. 
123 Meskin, ‘“Advantage to creditors”: a misconceived requirement’ Paper presented at the Annual Banking Law 
Update, held at Rand Afrikaans University (now the University of Johannesburg), Johannesburg, August 1995 3 
(copy on file with author). 
124 Meskin (note 123 above) 3. 
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Meskin further submitted that, in most cases, it is mere speculation as to whether or not there 
is reason to believe that sequestration will be to the advantage of creditors.125 He proposed 
that, ‘the process of administration of the sequestrated estate should be allowed to function 
precisely for the very purpose of determining whether it will yield any advantage to 
creditors.’126 He further submitted that: 127 
 ‘where a creditor can prove that his debtor has committed an act of insolvency, or is in 
fact insolvent and the creditor is willing to pay for the costs of the sequestration, which 
will not be payable out of the property of the estate, such creditor ought not to be 
denied sequestration because he lacks evidence to show the existence of reason to 
believe that sequestration would be advantageous to creditors’.  
 
More recently, a number of academic commentators have highlighted the challenges faced by 
consumer debtors, seeking to rely on voluntary surrender, who do not have sufficient assets to 
satisfy the advantage to creditors’ requirement.128 Roestoff and Coetzee submitted that the 
sequestration applications are already expensive because they are high court applications and 
therefore the stringent requirement of ‘advantage to creditors’ imposed by the Insolvency Act 
places a further stumbling block for debtors wishing to use its machinery.129 Further, Evans 
made an important observation that although the Insolvency Act does not differentiate 
between the classes of debtors in accordance with their differing or changing circumstances, 
the Act does in fact differentiate between those ‘rich debtors’ who are able show that the 
sequestration of their estate will benefit their creditors and the ‘poor debtors’ who cannot 
prove this.130  A consequence is that poor debtors are left to the mercy of their creditors while 
those debtors who are able to prove the advantage to creditors have a prospect of 
rehabilitation and a discharge from liability for pre-sequestration debts.131  
 
The Commission has recommended that the advantage to creditors requirement be retained. 
This will in effect results in debtors with few or no assets being excluded from enjoying a 
debt relief mechanism which provides discharge or what is termed a ‘fresh start’ in some 
foreign jurisdictions, as part of its dispensation.  Commentators have called for South African 
                                                          
125 Meskin (note 123 above) 6. 
126 Meskin (note 123 above) 6. 
127 Meskin (note 123 above) 6. 
128 Steyn (note 5 above) 339. 
129 Roestoff and Coetzee (note 26 above) 55. 
130 Evans (note 64 above) 508. 
131 Ex Parte Ford par 29. 
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The machinery of the Insolvency Act provides for sequestration of a debtor’s estate, either by 
voluntary surrender, at the instance of the debtor himself, or by compulsory sequestration of 
the debtor by a creditor, or creditors.133 A high court order for the sequestration of a debtor’s 
estate suspends or prevents the institution of, as the case may be, legal action by creditors 
against the debtor. Thereafter, creditors must lodge claims against the insolvent estate, which 
is administered by a trustee in whom all of the non-exempt assets of the estate vest and who 
is under a duty to liquidate them and to distribute the proceeds to creditors in accordance with 
the Insolvency Act’s provisions. An insolvent debtor may be rehabilitated, a consequence of 
which is that he will be discharged from liability for pre-sequestration debt. In these respects, 
sequestration may be regarded as a debt relief mechanism for an insolvent debtor.134 
 
However, that sequestration will be to the advantage of creditors must be proved before the 
court may grant a sequestration order and, even where this has occurred, and all of the other 
requirements have been met, the court nevertheless has the discretion whether to grant or 
refuse an order of sequestration.135  
 
Given the more stringent requirements for voluntary surrender, it may be understood why 
debtors and sympathetic creditors resort to friendly sequestration as a means to obtain debt 
relief for overburdened debtors. However, the scepticism and the cautious approach of courts 
towards friendly sequestration, and their insistence on clear proof of advantage to creditors, 
tend to frustrate their efforts in this regard.136 
 
Thus the Insolvency Act’s requirement of advantage to creditors, for a sequestration order to 
be granted, results in this procedure providing inadequate debt relief for debtors. The 
effectiveness of the debt relief option provided by the Insolvency Act can be questioned for 
differentiating between debtors with assets and those without. It is submitted that our law 
                                                          
132 Steyn (note 5 above) 219-220. 
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134 See 2.3.2. 
135 See 2.1. 
136 See Craggs v Dedekind. 
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requires reform to address this issue and to ensure that debtors with no income and no assets 
are also accommodated. 137 
 
                                                          
137 See 2.4. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ADMINISTRATION ORDERS IN TERMS OF THE MAGISTRATES’ COURTS ACT 
32 OF 1944 
3.1 Introduction 
An administration order is a debt relief option which assists a debtor who is in financial 
distress. In terms of section 65I of the Magistrates’ Courts Act (‘MCA’)138 an administration 
order may also be granted in favour of a judgment debtor during a section 65 enquiry into the 
debtor’s financial position.139 In an administration order, a debtor makes payments in 
instalments which are distributed to his creditors.140 Administration orders are available only 
to debtors whose total debts does not exceed R50 000. The process is initiated by means of an 
application by an individual debtor, made to a magistrate’s court, in terms of sections 74 and 
65I of the MCA.141  
 
It should be noted that this form of debt relief has been subject to abuse and equally has been 
criticised for not providing adequate debt relief for debtors. The inadequacy of administration 
orders is related inter alia to the monetary cap of R50 000 which excludes debtors with debts 
exceeding this amount. Further, administration orders lack provisions for debt discharge after 
a certain period. This chapter will look at the provisions of section 74 of the MCA and set out 
the procedure and requirements for administration orders as a form of a debt relief option and 
will identify some of the problems which are associated with this debt relief system 
 
3.2 Administration: procedure, requirements and related issues 
A debtor who is unable to pay an amount of any judgment against him or unable to meet his 
financial obligations may apply to have his estate placed under administration.142 Further, for 
a debtor to use section 74 he must have debts not exceeding R50 000. The procedure is 
initiated by a debtor by applying to court together with a statement of affairs in which the 
debtor affirms on oath that the names of the creditors and all other declarations made are 
true.143 The administration order must be in prescribed form and must set out that the debtor’s 
estate has been placed under administration, an administrator has been appointed and the 
                                                          
138 Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944. 
139 S 74(1) of the MCA. 
140 Boraine, ‘Some thoughts on the reform of administration orders and related issues’ (2003) 36 De Jure 217-
251, 230. 
141 Boraine (note 140 above) 256. 
142 S 74(1) of the MCA. 
143 S 74A (3) of the MCA. 
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amount that the debtor is obliged to pay. The application is lodged with the clerk of the 
magistrate court where the debtor resides or carries on business or is employed.144 The 
application is further delivered either personally or by registered post to the debtor’s creditors 
at least three days before the hearing.145 An administration order provides for the appointment 
of an administrator and for the payment of the debtor’s debt in instalment. 146 As part of the 
administrator’s duties he must pay the cost of the application for the administration order as a 
first claim against the moneys received by him, unless the court orders otherwise.147 If the 
application is successful it compels creditors to accept re-arrangement of the due and payable 
debt. It should be noted that in futuro debts are excluded from the administration order.148 
 
In terms of an administration order the debtor is obliged to make either monthly or weekly 
payment to the administrator. The task of the administrator is to deduct necessary expenses 
for the debtor and his own remuneration, which is determined by a prescribed tariff, and 
thereafter make regular distributions out of the payment to all proven creditors.149 The MCA 
provides for a hearing of an application for an administration order and any creditor may 
attend it and furnish proof of his debt and object to any debt listed by the debtor in the 
statement of affairs.150 The MCA also provides that the debtor may be interrogated by the 
court and any creditor or legal representative for such creditor with regard to the debtor’s 
assets and liabilities, his present and future expenses and all of his dependents living with 
him, his standard of living and the possibility of economising and any other facts that the 
court may deem relevant. This enquiry into the debtor’s affairs assists the court to establish 
how much a debtor can afford weekly or monthly.151 
An administration order only lapses when the debtor has paid all listed creditors in full.152 
Therefore, similar to the debt review of the NCA, it does not provide for discharge because 
                                                          
144 S 74A (5) of the MCA. 
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there is no fixed time within which debts must be paid; therefore, many debtors fall into a 
debt-trap.153 
3.3 Shortcomings of administration as a debt relief option  
Administration orders have been severely criticised for inherent shortcomings as a debt relief 
option. This paper will not discuss all of the shortcomings but will place emphasis on the 
monetary cap of R50 000; the lack of provision for a discharge; the application of 
administration orders being an act of insolvency; and the abuse of the administration process 
 
3.3.1 R50 000 monetary cap 
Although administration orders do provide debt relief for over-indebted debtors, it has been 
submitted that their application is limited in that they are only available to debtors with debts 
not exceeding R50 000.154 The effect of this limitation is that debtors with debts exceeding 
the stipulated monetary cap are excluded from seeking debt relief under this remedy.155 It has 
been submitted that, if the monetary cap was increased, it would provide a wider ambit for 
debtors to use this option, especially those debtors who are currently excluded from the relief 
offered in the Insolvency Act since they cannot prove advantage to creditors as required by 
the Insolvency Act.156  
 
3.3.2 Lack of provision for discharge  
It has already been established that, except for sequestration, none of the debt relief options 
provide for a discharge. Section 74 does not provide for discharge to a debtor whose estate is 
under administration. It is evident that alternatives to sequestration in the South African’s 
insolvency law regime do not offer a consumer what is termed, in the United State of 
America, as a ‘fresh start’. Although in African Bank Ltd v Weiner and other,157 the court 
held that it was never the intention of the legislature to have a debtor bound indefinitely in an 
                                                          
153 Roestoff et al, ‘The debt counselling process – Closing the loopholes in the National Credit Act 34 of 2005’ 
(2009) 12 PELJ  247-360, 260. 
154 Boraine, Roestoff & Coetzee, ‘Background to certain aspects relating to consumer insolvency in South 
Africa Center of  advanced corporate and insolvency law’, University of Pretoria 5. 
155 Boraine, Van Heerden & Roestoff, ‘A comparison between formal debt administration and debt review – the 
pros and cons of these measures and suggestions for law reform’ (2012) 2 De Jure (Part 2) 254 -271, 255. 
156 Boraine, Van Heerden and Roestoff (note 155 above) 231.                     
157 2005 (4) SA 363 (SCA). 
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administration order, the lack of such provision may result in a debtor being subject to the 
administration order for the rest of his life.158 
 
3.3.3 Application for administration as an act of insolvency 
Section 8 of the Insolvency Act designates certain acts or omissions as acts of insolvency.159 
Section 8(g) of the Act provides that a debtor has committed an act of insolvency if he gives 
written notice of inability to pay any of his debts. Courts have held  that  this act of 
insolvency is committed when a debtor makes an application for an administration order 
under section 74 of the MCA unless the statement of assets and liabilities shows that the 
debtor is not insolvent and could be compelled to pay his debts in full.160 For example, in 
Madari v Cassim161 the respondent, who was in the business of selling fruits and vegetables 
and had three stalls at the market, filed for an application for administration order under 
section 74 of the MCA. He made £60 per month and, his business having fallen into financial 
difficulties, he had offered to pay his creditors £10 per month for distribution under the 
administration order.162  
 
In an application for the sequestration of his estate the court stated that the act of insolvency 
committed by the respondent was the very fact of making an application for an 
administration. The court further stated that the respondent had resorted to this remedy as he 
was unable to discharge his liabilities and had insufficient assets capable of attachment to 
satisfy such liabilities. In the course of applying for administration gave notice in writing to 
all his creditors that he was unable to pay any of his debts and such an act, the court held, 
constituted an act of insolvency as contemplated in section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act. Thus, 
when a debtor, who wishes to retain his assets, applies for an administration order, it creates 





                                                          
158 Boraine, Van Heerden and Roestoff   (note 155 above) 256. See also Boraine and Roestoff 2014 THRHR  
(note 3 above) 354, where the authors stated that without some provisions for discharge in a debt relief 
procedure, many debtors will remain debt trap. 
159 See 2.2.3. 
160 Mars, The Law of Insolvency (note 19 above) 98. 
161 1953 (2) SA 35 (D). 
162 Madari v Cassim par 156. 
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3.3.4 Administration orders an abuse of process 
 A large scale of abuse of process has been identified in the manner in which administration 
orders are administered. In the first instance administrators, unlike debt counsellors are not 
govern by any regulatory body as a result anyone can become an administrator as there are no 
prescribed requirements or qualifications to become one. The absence of a regulatory body 
for administrators has resulted in the courts appointing persons without appropriate 
qualifications as administrators e.g. people with unsettled debts themselves and people who 
have been struck of the roll as attorneys.163 These administrators encourage debtors who with 
have otherwise benefitted from another resolution to go under administration and this 
increases the debtor’s debt and benefit only the administrator.164Another abuse is that of 
administrators overcharging for remuneration and expenses and thus adding to the debtor’s 
burden.165  
 
Boraine notes that, the increase in number of consumers being able to access credit has not 
only lead to more debtors finding themselves in a debt trap, but has also led to a growing 
number of entities offering the services of assisting over-indebted consumers by placing them 
under administration.166 A large number of debtors are being misled into the process as a 
result of being advised with inaccurate information by administrators- the debtors are seldom 
advised about the costs of the application for administration orders or what the 
administrator’s fees will be.167 In essence this means that a debtor is not properly informed on 
how the process of administration works, except by being told that his debts will be re-
arranged and they must make a certain amount of payment every month. The shortcomings 
set out above are one of the many reasons why this debt relief option does not provide 
adequate debt relief to debtors. 
 
3.4 Conclusion  
Administration orders were designed to come to the rescue of debtors who found themselves 
in financial crisis, and who could not use the provisions of the Insolvency Act – as explained 
earlier, administration is an easy and less expensive procedure than, although akin to 
sequestration. The administration procedure may only be initiated by a debtor who has a 
                                                          
163 Boraine, Van Heerden and Roestoff (Part 2) (note 155 above) 230. 
164 Boraine, Van Heerden and Roestoff (Part 2) (note 155 above) 230. 
165 Boraine, Van Heerden and Roestoff (Part 2) (note 155 above) 230. 
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judgment debt against him or who is going through financial difficulties.168 However, various 
shortcomings have been identified in relation to this debt relief option. These include the 
monetary limitation of R50 000, the lack of provision for discharge to debtor, the fact that 
application for an administration order is categorised as an act of insolvency as well as the 
large scale of abuse regarding administration orders.169 In light of the problems associated 
with administration orders, it remains doubtful whether this debt relief option does in fact 
provide adequate debt relief for over-indebted debtors.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DEBT REVIEW AND DEBT RE-ARRANGEMENT IN TERMS OF THE NATIONAL 
CREDIT ACT 34 OF 2005 
4.1 Introduction  
One of the main objectives of the NCA, which came into full operation on 1 June 2007, is to 
afford debt relief to over-burdened consumers.170 The NCA seeks to achieve this objective 
through the provisions creating and regulating the mechanism of debt review.171 The NCA 
promotes the notion of debtors fulfilling their debts in full. The form of debt relief envisaged, 
therefore, is that a consumer debtor may, by way of debt review eventually obtain a 
rescheduling of his credit agreement debt, either by means of a voluntary re-arrangement plan 
with all of his credit providers or as ordered by a court.172  
 
This chapter discusses the NCA’s debt review provisions and identifies some shortcomings of 
the debt review system. Pertinent provisions of the NCA will also be discussed below, in 
Chapter 5.  
 
4.2 Objectives of the NCA 
The objectives of the NCA are expressed in its section 3 and include, inter alia, to: 
(i) promote responsibility in the credit market, by encouraging consumers to 
borrow responsibly; 
(ii) avoid over-indebtedness;   
(iii) fulfil their financial obligations; and 
(iv) discourage reckless credit granting by credit providers and contractual default 
by consumers.173  
The NCA does not only aim to assist consumers who are over-indebted, but it also to a large 





                                                          
170 S 3 of the NCA. 
171 Van Heerden and Boraine, ‘The interaction between debt relief measures in the National Credit Act 34 of 
2005 and Aspects of Insolvency law’ (2009) 12 (3) PELJ 22-161, 22. 
172 Van Heerden and Boraine   (note 171 above) 22. 
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4.3 Definition of over-indebtedness 
Van Heerden and Boraine submitted that over-indebtedness has a very specific meaning 
within the NCA, as it only applies to debts that arise out of credit agreements and that fall 
within the scope of the NCA.175 Section 79 of the NCA provides the definition for over-
indebtedness. According to section 79 (1) (a) - 
a consumer is over-indebted if the preponderance of available information at the time 
a determination is made, indicates that the particular consumer is or will be unable to 
satisfy in a timely manner all the obligations under all the credit agreements to which 
the consumer is a party, having regard to that consumer's- 
(a) financial means, prospects and obligations; and 
(b)   probable propensity to satisfy in a timely manner all the obligations under all 
the credit agreements to which the consumer is a party, as indicated by the 
consumer's history of debt repayment.176  
 
Section 79 (2) goes on to say that, when a determination is to be made whether a consumer is 
over-indebted or not, the person making that determination must apply the criteria set out in 
subsection (1) as they exist at the time the determination is being made.177 
 
A mere allegation of over-indebtedness is insufficient. The over-indebtedness should be 
established on a balance of probabilities as envisaged by section 79 (1), which refers to the 
preponderance of available information at the time a determination is made.178 The way in 
which over-indebtedness is addressed is by making provision for debt review and debt 
restructuring.179 A consumer debtor is required to make an application to be declared over-
indebted.180 If it is alleged that the consumer under a credit agreement is over-indebted, 
despite anything to the contrary the court has the power to refer the matter directly to a debt 
counsellor requesting the debt counsellor to evaluate the consumer’s circumstances and make 
a recommendation to the court in terms of section 86 or declare the debtor over-indebted and 
make an order, as set out in section 87, to address the debtor’s over-indebtedness.  
                                                          
175 Van Heerden and Boraine (note 171 above) 31. 
176 S 79 of the NCA.  
177 S 79 (2) of the NCA. 
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4.4 Debt review in terms of the NCA 
The NCA introduced the debt review process for debt arising out of credit agreements 
whereby a consumer is either referred to the debt counsellor or he seeks the services of the 
debt counsellor on his own initiative before debt enforcement procedures are commenced 
against him.181 In certain circumstances the consumer may approach the court for debt 
review.182 However, it must be noted that the NCA only applies to debts as defined in the Act 
itself and not all debts are covered by it. Consumer debtors, who are under the debt review 
process, may utilise other debt relief measures, such as voluntary surrender or administration 
orders.183 The court also has discretion to refer the matter for debt review during any pending 
procedure in a court that is concerned with a credit agreement. However, debt review will 
cover only those agreements entered into before the institution of legal action.184  In light of 
the enactment of the new section 8A of the Insolvency Act, a debtor who applies for debt 
review is not deemed to have committed an act of insolvency in terms of the Insolvency Act. 
 
The process of debt review commences when a consumer applies to the debt counsellor to be 
declared over-indebted and to be placed under debt review. At the initial stages of the debt 
review process, the debt counsellor must review the debtor’s credit agreements to establish 
whether he is in fact over-indebted and whether reckless credit was granted.185 
Notwithstanding any provisions of law or agreement to the contrary, if its appears in any 
court proceedings in which a credit agreement is considered that the consumer is over-
indebted, the court is given a discretion in terms of section 85 of the Act to either refer the 
matter to the debt counsellor and request the debt counsellor to evaluate the consumer’s 
circumstances and make a recommendation to the court in terms of section 86 (7) or to 
declare and relieve the over-indebtedness and make an order in terms of section 87.186 
Consumers who are over-indebted may therefore apply for debt review or alternatively wait 
for a creditor to enforce a credit agreement in respect which the consumer is in default and 
then raise the issue of over-indebtedness in court. 
 
                                                          
181 Boraine (note 178 above) 6. 
182 Boraine (note 178 above) 5. 
183 Boraine (note 178 above) 5. 
184 Boraine (note 178 above) 7. 
185 S 86 (6) (7) of the NCA. 
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If a debt counsellor makes a recommendation in terms of section 86 (7) (b) of the NCA187 
between the consumer debtor and the credit provider and the debtor and his service provider 
accept the proposal, the debt counsellor is required to record the proposal and if the consumer 
debtor and each credit provider consent, file the proposal as a consent order.188 However, if 
the proposal is not accepted the debt counsellor must refer the matter to the magistrate court 
with the recommendations. 
 
In terms of section 86 (7) (c) of the NCA, the debt counsellor may issue a proposal, 
recommending that the magistrate’s court make either or both of the following orders: that - 
  (i)   one or more of the consumer's credit agreements be declared reckless credit, if                    
the debt counsellor has concluded that those agreements appear to be reckless; or 
  (ii)   one or more of the consumer's obligations be re-arranged by: 
 extending the period of the agreement and reducing the amount of each 
payment due accordingly; 
 postponing during a specified period the dates on which payments are due 
under the agreement; 
 extending the period of the agreement and postponing during a specified 
period the dates on which payments are due under the agreement; or 
 recalculating the consumer's obligations because of contraventions of Part 
A or B of Chapter 5, or Part A of Chapter 6.189 
 
If a debt counsellor rejects the debtor’s application, the consumer, with leave of the 
magistrate’s court, may apply directly to the magistrate’s court to have his debt re-arranged 
as contemplated by section 86 (7) (c).  If a consumer is in default under a credit agreement 
that is under review, the credit provider in respect of that credit agreement may give notice to 
the debtor, debt counsellor and the National Credit Regulator that he is terminating the 
                                                          
187 S 86 (7) (b) of the NCA provides that if a debt counsellor makes a proposal to the magistrate's court in terms 
of section 86 (8) (b), or a consumer applies to the magistrate's court in terms of section 86 (9), the magistrate's 
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review. However, the magistrate’s court still has the power to order that debt review be 
resumed on any conditions the court considers to be just in the circumstances.  
 
4.5 Shortcomings of debt review as a debt relief option 
A number of problems with the NCA have been identified in the media and by academics 
since its enactment and implementation.190 In this dissertation two of these issues will be 
identified and discussed. These issues are: first, the fact that the NCA makes no provision for 
any form of discharge from indebtedness for the consumer; and secondly, debt review does 
not constitute a bar to the sequestration of the debtor’s estate. 
 
As mentioned in above, it is clear from the expressly stated objectives of the NCA that debt 
review is not aimed at offering debtors a formal discharge from liability for their debts. 
Although one of the objectives of the NCA is to provide debt relief through re-arrangement 
of debts where a debtor is over-indebted, this debt relief option is still premised on the 
principle of full satisfaction.191 Johnson and Meyerman submit that the NCA, despite its aims 
to assist over-indebted consumers, only perpetuates the over-indebtedness by lacking 
provision for a discharge mechanism.192 Thus the effect is that debt review will never afford 
an opportunity to a consumer debtor to obtain a discharge from his pre-existing 
indebtedness.193 The lack of discharge provisions in the NCA may also result in debtors 
remaining in debt almost indefinitely and cause an escalation in the amount of the debt, due 
to the cost and interest factor.194  
 
The fact that a debtor who has applied for, or is subject to, debt review is not precluded from 
having his estate sequestrated is another serious shortcoming of the process. This issue will 
be discussed in chapter 5 which deals with the interface between the Insolvency Act and the 
NCA.195 
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4.6 Conclusion 
Debt relief in the form of the debt review process was introduced by the NCA with one of its 
objective being to ensure that a debtor meets his financial obligations in full.196 As discussed 
above this debt relief remedy is available to an over-indebted debtor with debts falling within 
the scope of section 8 of the NCA and who has a regular income to make contributions in the 
event that his debts are re-arranged. The debt review process is initiated by the debtor in 
financial distress and only the court may declare the consumer debtor over-indebted. Upon 
being declared over-indebted the debtor’s debts may inter alia be re-arranged. The discussion 
above has identified the lack of provision for discharge and debt review not being a bar to 
sequestration as the main shortcomings that might contribute to this debt relief option not 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE INTERFACE BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICAN INSOLVENCY AND CONSUMER 
CREDIT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The lack of express statutory provisions regulating the relationship between the Insolvency 
Act and the NCA has far reaching consequences in our consumer insolvency system. This has 
led to a fair amount of litigation and has given rise to a series of significant court judgments. 
Both the NCA and the Insolvency Act regulate, amongst other things, matters relating to 
over-indebted debtors who are unable to fulfil their financial obligations.198 The overlap 
between the two statutes results in an ever present danger that tension may arise at any given 
case.199  The relationship between the two statutes has been the subject of recent discussion in 
several academic works. Inevitably, issues have surrounded the effect of the NCA’s provision 
for debt review and debt restructuring on insolvency law in general and, more particularly, 
sequestration.200  
 
Section 2 of the NCA provides that the Act must be construed in a manner which gives effect 
to section 3.201 However, section 2 (7) of the NCA makes it clear that the provisions of the 
Act are not to be construed in a manner that amends, limits or repeals any provisions of any 
Act. The provisions of the NCA make no mention of the Insolvency Act and it has been 
argued that, if the legislature intended the provisions of the NCA to override the conflicting 
provisions of the Insolvency Act, it would have expressly stated such.202 Section 172 of the 
NCA is the only provision that expressly amends the provisions of section 84 (1) of the 
Insolvency Act.203 The interaction between the provisions of the NCA and the Insolvency Act 
has been evident in a number of cases in which the courts have been required to resolve 
disputes concerning the application of and interaction between these two statutes, particularly 
in the context of sequestration and debt review.204 The main cases and the issues raised in 
them will be discussed below. 
                                                          
198 Chokuda, ‘An application for debt review does not constitute an act of insolvency: FirstRand Bank v Janse 
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5.2 Sequestration and debt review 
5.2.1 Voluntary surrender and debt review 
 The case of Ex parte Ford concerned three applications made by debtors for the 
sequestration of their estate.  The liabilities of each of the three applicants consisted of debts 
owed to financial institutions or lenders in the form of loans or over-drafts.205 It was common 
cause that their credit agreements fell within the definition of the NCA. The applicants stated 
in their affidavits that they considered debt counselling but expressed that debt re-
arrangement would be financially impracticable because even after seven years of paying 
their debts in terms of a restructured payment plan, they would still not be clear of them. The 
court found the debts owed by the applicants to be disproportionate taking into account their 
modest income. This factor resulted in the court suspecting reckless lending on the part of the 
financial institutions. The court found it appropriate to reiterate the objectives of the NCA set 
out in section 3, one of which is to prevent reckless lending. The court then referred to its 
power in terms of section 85 of the NCA.206 The court pointed out that an evaluation by the 
debt counsellor could have resulted in one or more of the credit agreements being declared 
reckless and consequently having them set aside or suspended.207 
 
The court requested the applicants’ counsel to justify why the over-indebtedness of the 
applicants should not be addressed using the debt review mechanism of the NCA instead of 
opting for the machinery of voluntary surrender.208 Counsel for the applicants stated that the 
legislature was cognisant of the provisions of the Insolvency Act when it enacted the NCA. 
He argued that the legislature had not seen fit to make any changes to the provisions of the 
NCA regarding voluntary surrender and he further argued that section 85 of the NCA did not 
apply to voluntary surrender proceedings. He stated that section 85 of the NCA was 
dependent on the fulfilment of three requirements namely, the context of the court 
proceedings, the allegation of over-indebtedness in the proceedings by a consumer, and 
lastly, consideration by a court in those proceedings of the credit agreement.209 He conceded 
that the first two requirements had been satisfied but argued that the third requirement was 
not met.  He stated that the intention of the legislature was for section 85 only to apply to 
cases in which the terms of the credit agreement were being considered by a court in the 
                                                          
205 Ex parte Ford par 2. 
206 See 4.4 (note 180 above) for the discussion of the court’s discretion in terms of section 85 of the NCA. 
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context of resistance, on grounds of over-indebtedness, by a consumer debtor to a creditor’s 
claim for performance in terms of a credit agreement.210 
 
The court held that the language of section 85 was cast in very wide terms and that the 
provision that a court may invoke the section, despite any provision of law or agreement to 
the contrary, indicated the intended wide ambit for its operation.211 The court further stated 
that the limitation of the provisions to proceedings in which a credit agreement is being 
considered does not imply that the proceedings in question are restricted only to those in 
which the enforcement of a credit agreement is the issue.212 The court also emphasised that 
the provisions of section 4 of the Insolvency Act require the applicant for voluntary surrender 
to make full and frank disclosure of his assets and to satisfy the court that acceptance of the 
surrender of the estate in question will be to the advantage of creditors.213   
 
The court was also not persuaded by the averments made by the applicants that debt re-
arrangement was impracticable in their circumstances. The court stated that the NCA 
provided a wide remedial relief which can be accommodate any particular case. This 
included: disallowance of the recovery of the debt if such lending was reckless; staying the 
accrual of interest; and ranking liability. Further, the court found no evidence of proper 
considerations for debt counselling and the debt counsellor did not consider obtaining a 
declaration of reckless credit in respect of the debts.214  Further, the court held that it was not 
prepared to exercise its discretion in favour of granting the application for voluntary 
surrender, due to the applicants’ failure to properly explain why their credit agreement debts 
were not appropriate for administration under the NCA.215 The court reminded that it had a 
duty to give effect to the public policy reflected in the NCA and public policy gives 
preference to rights of responsible credit grantors over reckless creditors and enjoins full 
satisfaction by the debtors on their financial obligations.216 
 
                                                          
210 Ex parte Ford par 11. 
211 Ex parte Ford par 12. 
212 Ex Parte Ford par 12. 
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The court concluded by reminding debtors that the argument that they are entitled to choose 
the form of debt relief that suit their convenience, is a misdirected one, especially where the 
grant of the selected remedy is discretionary.217 The court also remarked regarding the 
relationship between the NCA and the Insolvency Act, that a consonance exists between the 
object of the two statutes which is not to deprive creditors of their claims but merely to 
regulate the manner and extent of their payment.218 The court was of the view that the 
circumstances in which the applicants were able to obtain credit from financial and money 
lending institutions and their failure to utilise the remedies under the NCA have been 
inadequately explained.219 The court also held that the demonstrated monetary advantage in 
each of the applicant’s case was marginal.220  For these reasons the court concluded that the 
machinery of the NCA was more appropriate in these circumstances and consequently 
refused the applications.  
 
Boraine and Van Heerden submitted that it was clear that the court wanted the applicants in 
this instance to get a proper determination on whether or not their credit agreements 
amounted to reckless credit, since the court did have a suspicion that this might have been the 
case.221 It was further submitted that, in light of the decision of Ex Parte Ford, it was clear 
that over-indebtedness and reckless credit may play a significant role with regard to the 
applicant’s ability to either choose voluntary surrender or compulsory sequestration to satisfy 
the court that sequestration is the option most beneficial to creditors where the debts consist 
largely of the credit agreements regulated by the NCA.222 Boraine and Van Heerden agreed 
with the decision in Ex Parte Ford that the court has discretion to grant the sequestration 
order or not especially considering the advantage to creditors requirement, however they 
expressed that this decision indicated that some judges remained extremely pro-creditor 
oriented and the provisions of the NCA inherited this trait.223  
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5.2.2 Compulsory sequestration and debt review 
(a)  General 
As stated above sequestration proceedings may be initiated by a creditor who may apply to 
court to have his debtor’s estate sequestrated.224 The fact that it is a creditor, who applies for 
the compulsory sequestration of the debtor’s estate, may influence the court to grant such 
order.225 In compulsory sequestration creditors are not relived of the burden of proving 
advantage to creditors, although the onus of proof is not as heavy as it is in a voluntary 
surrender application.226 
 
As in a voluntary surrender application, creditors in a compulsory sequestration application 
may intervene in the proceedings for various reasons. A creditor may intervene where he is of 
the view that a consumer debtor who is over-indebted, but has not yet been for debt review by 
the time the sequestration proceedings are brought, should be referred to court where it can be 
determined which debt relief option would be in the interests of creditors. A creditor may also 
intervene by arguing that a consumer, who is already subject to a debt restructuring order and 
is maintaining payments in terms of it, should remain subject to such order because this 
would serve the advantage of creditors better than sequestration.227 
 
(b)  Debt review not a bar to sequestration 
The question whether a sequestration proceeding amounts to enforcing a credit agreement 
was raised as an issue in Investec v Mutemeri.228 In this case, the applicants applied for the 
compulsory sequestration of the joint estate of the respondents. The respondents opposed the 
application, arguing, inter alia, that, because the applicants’ claims against them were based 
on credit agreements within the meaning of the NCA, the application for the sequestration of 
their estates was barred under the NCA.229 The respondents were essentially arguing that an 
application for compulsory sequestration amounts to the enforcement of a debt, which is 
barred in terms of sections 129 (1) (b) and130 (1) (b) of the NCA. 
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225 Van Heerden and Boraine (note 171 above) 52. 
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228 See note 8 above. 
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The court held that the real question to be answered in this case was whether an application 
for sequestration of a consumer's estate, that is based on the applicant's claim against the 
consumer in terms of a credit agreement, is an application ‘for an order to enforce a credit 
agreement’ within the meaning of section 130 (1).230 In answering this question, the court 
referred to the case of Estate Logie v Priest (‘Estate Logie’),231 where the court expressed that 
there is ‘doubt that in an application for compulsory sequestration the creditor seeks payment 
of the debt from his debtor.’232 In Investec v Mutemeri, the court clarified that whether an 
application for sequestration constitutes an application for an order to enforce a credit 
agreement, within the meaning of section 130 (1) of the NCA, depends on the nature of the 
relief sought by the creditor, and not on the sequestrating creditor's underlying motive in 
bringing the application.233 The court stated that, whatever a credit provider's underlying 
motive, the application is not barred by section 130 (1) unless it is an application for an order 
'to enforce a credit agreement'.234 
 
The court relied on precedent established in the case of Collet v Priest235 where De Villiers 
CJ explained thus why it could not be said that an application for sequestration was a 
proceeding by which one party sued for or claimed something from another:236 
‘The order placing a person's estate under sequestration cannot fittingly be described 
as an order for a debt due by the debtor to the creditor. Sequestration proceedings are 
instituted by a creditor against a debtor not for the purpose of claiming something 
from the latter, but for the purpose of setting the machinery of the law in motion to 
have the debtor declared insolvent.’237 
 
In Investec v Mutemeri, the court concluded that the rationale of these judgments is equally 
applicable to the proper interpretation of section 130(1) of the NCA, which applies only to an 
application to court 'for an order to enforce a credit agreement'.238 Trengove AJ 
unequivocally stated that section 130 (1) of the NCA does not apply to an application by a 
credit provider for the sequestration of a consumer's estate based on a claim in terms of a 
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238 Investec v Mutemeri par 31. 
 41  
  
credit agreement entered into between them. Such an application is not one for an order 
enforcing the credit provider's claim against the consumer 
 
The case of Investec v Mutemeri also dealt with the issue whether a creditor who has received 
a notice that a debtor has applied for debt review may proceed with the application for a 
sequestration order of the debtor’s estate.  The respondents invoked the provisions of section 
88 (3) of the NCA which provides, inter alia, that a credit provider, who receives notice of a 
consumer's application for debt review in terms of s 86 (4) (b) (i), may not exercise or 
enforce by litigation or other judicial process any right or security under a credit agreement 
between the credit provider and the consumer, until certain conditions have been met.239 It 
was held in this respect that an application for sequestration did not qualify as litigation or 
other judicial process to enforce any right under a credit agreement.240 Consequently, in view 
of this decision, it appears that a credit provider may apply for compulsory sequestration 
while the consumer is under debt review. 241 
 
The decision in Investec v Mutemeri was confirmed by the SCA in Naidoo v Absa Bank 
Ltd,242 that sequestration does not amount to legal proceedings to enforce an agreement, as 
envisaged by section 129 read with section 130 (3) of the NCA.243 The sequestration order in 
this case stemmed from the appellant’s failure to meet payments due to the respondent under 
instalment sale agreements relating to six motor vehicles and two home loan agreements.244 It 
was common cause that the credit agreements fell within the definition of section 8 of the 
NCA.245 The appellant contended that the respondent was not competent to have instituted 
proceedings for his sequestration before complying with the procedure provided for in section 
129 (1) (a) of the NCA.246 
 
The court held that the language employed in section 130 (3) (a) does not extend the remit of 
section 129 to sequestration proceedings but simply alludes to the situation that, where a 
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241 Maghembe, ‘The appellate division has spoken: sequestration proceedings do not qualify as proceedings to 
enforce a credit agreement under the National Credit Act 34 of 2005: Naidoo v Absa Bank 2010 4 SA 597 
(SCA)’ (2011) 15 PELJ 171-226, 175. 
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credit provider decides to institute proceedings to enforce the agreement, he may do so only 
after having complied with the procedure set out in section 129 (1) (a).247 In the result, 
creditors do not need to comply with the requirements set out in section 129 (1) (a) before 
instituting sequestration proceedings against a consumer, because such proceedings are not 
proceedings to enforce a credit agreement.248  
 
In a more recent case of FirstRand Bank v Kona and others,249 the SCA set aside the North 
Gauteng High Court’s decision, that an application by a creditor for the sequestration of his 
debtor’s estate constituted ‘other judicial process’ in terms of section 88 (3), and that the debt 
re-arrangement order, unless set aside by a competent court, barred any sequestration 
application by a creditor.250 The SCA re-affirmed the position in Naidoo v Absa and Investec 
v Mutemeri that, sequestration proceedings by a creditor against the estate of his debtor was 
not tantamount to ‘litigation or other judicial process within the meaning of section 88 (3)’.251 
Further, the court held that recognising that the provisions of section 88 (3) did not constitute 
a bar to the institution of sequestration proceedings, implied that the existence of a debt re-
arrangement order was immaterial to the application for sequestration of the debtor’s estate, 
unless the debt re-arrangement order was raised as a circumstance for the court to exercise its 
discretion in favour of the debtor.252 
 
In light of the above cases and, in particular, the more recent decision of FirstRand Bank v 
Kona, it is clear that in the absence of any legislative intervention, the position established in 
the case law regarding debt review not barring sequestration will remain. Therefore, although 
the international principles makes a recommendation that creditors should be prohibited from 
pursuing the debtor during the insolvency process,253 consumer debtors are not in fact 
protected by the NCA against creditors seeking to sequestrate their estate. 
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(c) Application for debt review an act of insolvency? 
Until recently, a debtor who gave notice in writing to any of his creditors that he was unable 
to pay any of his debts was deemed to have committed an act of insolvency in terms of 
section 8 (g).254 In FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans255 and in FirstRand Bank v Janse Van 
Rensburg,256 the courts were asked to pronounce on the question whether an application by 
the debtor to be placed under debt review in terms of section 86 of the NCA constitutes an act 
of insolvency in terms of section 8 (g) of the Insolvency Act. In FirstRand Bank v Evans, the 
case was concerned with an application for the provisional sequestration of the estate of the 
respondent. Evans was indebted to the bank for an amount of R2.8 million obtained as a loan 
secured by two mortgage bonds passed over for his immovable properties.257 The bank 
bought the application on the ground that Evans committed an act of insolvency.258 Evans 
had applied for debt review in terms of the NCA and had addressed the letter to FNB 
informing them that he was under debt review.  
The court stated that a proper approach to be adopted in establishing whether a letter such as 
the one written by Evans constituted a notice of inability to pay in terms of section 8 (g) of 
the Insolvency Act is by considering how it would be understood by a reasonable person in 
the position of the creditor receiving the letter.259 The court held that the notice, when 
received by FNB, conveyed to FNB that Evans could not at present time pay in accordance 
with his commitment. However, counsel for the respondent argued that the letter conveyed an 
intention to have the respondent’s debts re-arranged as contemplated by section 86 of the 
NCA.260 The court argued that although the submission by the respondent’s counsel was 
correct it did not alter the fact that the respondent wrote a letter unequivocally conveying to 
FNB that he was at that time unable to pay his debts.261 Counsel for the respondent then 
submitted that any debtor who informs his creditor that he has applied for debt review or that 
he is in the process of debt review would result in his creditor alleging a commission of an act 
of insolvency.262 
                                                          
254 S 8 (g) of the Insolvency Act. 
255 See note 8 above. 
256 See note 8 above. 
257 Evans par 1. 
258 Evans par 1. 
259 Evans par 14. 
260 Evans par 21. 
261 Evans par 21. 
262 Evans par 21. 
 44  
  
The court referred to Madari v Cassim,263 where it was held that a debtor who gives notice to 
his creditors of an intention to apply for an administration order in terms of section 74 of the 
MCA did commit an act of insolvency.264 The court relied on Madari v Cassim and held that 
it failed to see why the provisions of section 8 (g) of the Insolvency Act should be interpreted 
differently as a result of the enactment of the NCA and if the legislature intended to qualify 
section 8 (g) it would have expressly done so.265 Therefore, the court concluded that a letter 
informing a creditor of the debtor’s inability to pay his debts, together with a request to pay 
the debt over a period of time in smaller instalments would constitute an act of insolvency in 
terms of section 8 (g) of the Insolvency Act.266 
 
In FirstRand Bank v Janse Van Rensburg, the court did not follow the approach set out in 
Evans. It was alleged that the respondents committed an act of insolvency by applying for 
debt review in terms of the NCA.267 The bank relied on the consumer profile report issued by 
a credit bureau which stated that each of the respondents had applied for debt review.268 The 
issue in this case was whether an application for debt review constituted an act of insolvency 
and whether the applicant had established that such an act has been committed.269 Counsel for 
the applicant submitted that an application for debt review in terms of section 86 of the NCA 
does not constitute an act of insolvency in terms of section 8 (g) of the Insolvency Act. He 
relied on the judgement by Wallis J (as he then was) in Evans, where the court pronounced 
that an application for an administration order was an act of insolvency.270  
 
The court dismissed counsel’s submission and held that Evans was not authority that the 
application for debt review in terms of the NCA fell within the scope of section 8 (g) of the 
Insolvency Act.271 Further, the court stated that the judge was not called upon to decide 
whether the application for debt review in terms of the NCA constituted an act of insolvency 
and he made no such finding.272 The court stated that the judge’s remarks that a debt review 
was not a novel position since applicants for administration orders are in precisely the same 
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position was held in obiter and the judge did not find that an application for debt review in 
terms of the NCA ipso facto constituted an act of insolvency.273 Thus the court took the view 
that Madari v Cassim was not authority for such a proposition.274 
 
The court drew a distinction between the facts in Madari v Cassim and the case before it and 
held that the decision in Madari did not deal with whether a notice of intention to apply for 
an administration order constituted an act of insolvency, but that the issue whether an act of 
insolvency has been committed, appeared to have been common cause.275 The court also 
further provided a distinction between the two procedures, namely, administration and debt 
review. The court stated that the administration order procedure is akin to a ‘modified form of 
insolvency’ which is applicable to small estates in which a concursus creditorum is 
created.276 The application to be placed under administration entails a submission by a debtor 
of his detailed statement of affairs, confirmation of the correctness of the information under 
oath, a motivation as to the basis of his inability to meet his financial obligations and most 
importantly, delivery of a notice of the application to creditors.277 Thus the application itself 
meets the requirements of section 8 (g) of the Insolvency Act because a notice is delivered to 
a creditor in which a debtor states his inability to meet his financial obligations.278 
 
On the other hand the procedure to apply for debt review in terms of the NCA is a different 
procedure to section 74 of the MCA. The procedure for debt review is an application made by 
a consumer debtor to a registered debt counsellor. A debtor is required to submit a particular 
form and supporting documents and information to the debt counsellor and upon receipt of 
the application the debt counsellor is required to issue a notice to all the listed creditors 
informing that an application for debt review has been received.279 Thus the application 
submitted by the debtor and the information contained in the form is not provided to the 
credit provider.280 The court held that, if the words of the notification do not convey an 
unequivocal statement of inability to meet a debtor’s obligation, the fact that the creditor may 
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have construed the notice in that manner does not render the notice to be one in terms of 
section 8 (g) of the Insolvency Act.281 
 
The written notice which the applicant relied on was one which was communicated by a 
credit bureau rather than by the debtor.282 The court found that there was nothing suggesting 
that the credit bureau was authorised by the respondents to make declaration on behalf of the 
respondents nor did they hold such authority in regard to the affairs of the respondents.283 The 
court in support of its argument referred to Eli Spilikin (Pty) Ltd v Mather,284 where it was 
held that if an agent on behalf of a debtor, writes a letter which amounts to an act of 
insolvency in terms of section 8 (g) of the Act, he the agent must be satisfied that the 
principal knew that the letter was being written in those terms and consented to it being so 
written.285 In light of the above, the court found that the applicant failed to establish that the 
respondents committed an act of insolvency. 
Chokuda submitted that the FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg judgment was significant 
in our law as it clarified the contentious interface between the provisions of the debt review 
and sequestration.286 Although the decision in Janse van Rensburg may have settled the 
uncertainty of whether the application for debt review amounted to an act of insolvency, a 
possibility of another challenge to these provisions always existed, and this was evidence of 
the lacuna that was ever present which required legislative intervention. In the recent case of 
De Klerk,287 the Constitutional Court dealt with an appeal that raised the question of whether 
a debt re-structuring proposal in terms of section 86 (1) of the NCA sent to a creditor on the 
instructions of a debtor was an act of insolvency thus allowing a creditor to initiate 
sequestration proceedings.288 The Constitutional Court was of the view that since the 
applicant, Mr De Klerk was in fact factually insolvent it should not interfere with findings of 
the high court. Further, the court avoided to deal with this issue on the basis that, a legislative 
amendment to the NCA was in the process of being enacted, at the time the application was 
heard, and this amendment clarified the issue in dispute in this case.289 
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As Steyn had correctly submitted, perhaps clarification by the Supreme Court of Appeal or 
the legislature may finally put this issue to rest. Steyn also made a notable submission that 
precedent relevant to application for administration orders in terms of section 74 of the MCA 
should not be applied automatically to cases concerning the NCA and its relationship with the 
provisions of the Insolvency Act.  More recently, the call for legislative intervention has been 
addressed by the enactment of the new section 8A of the Insolvency Act. Section 8A appears 
to have been enacted to address some of the shortcomings of the NCA and the Insolvency Act 
in not providing specifically for the relationship between them, the new section provides that 
a debtor who applies for debt review has not commit an act of insolvency. 
 
Otto and Otto submitted that the exact influence of the insolvency law on the NCA, and vice 
versa, is something that still has to be worked out by courts.290  It remains to be seen whether 
the new section 8A of the Insolvency Act, will in fact adequately resolve some of the issues 
between the provisions of the NCA and the Insolvency Act, following the courts’ future 
application of this legislative amendment.  
 
5.3 Conclusion 
The legislature, when enacting the NCA, failed to make express provision to exclude the 
application of the Insolvency Act or for the NCA to prevail. As a result, conflict has arisen 
between some of the provisions of the NCA and the Insolvency Act. This paper has identified 
some of the issues which present a conflict in the application of these two statutes. The main 
issue is that the estate of a debtor who applies for or is subjected to debt review is not 
protected from sequestration by his creditors. The second issue was the application for debt 
review being construed as an act of insolvency in terms of section 8 (g) of the Insolvency 
Act, thus allowing a creditor to apply for the sequestration of the estate of his debtor. This 
issue has been recently resolved by the enactment of section 8A of the Insolvency Act. In 
terms of the provisions of section 8A a debtor who has applied for debt review is no longer 
deemed to have committed an act of insolvency. This development is a positive one as we 
have seen courts grapple and come to different outcomes regarding this issue. It would have 
however been interesting to know how the Constitutional Court would have answered this 
question if it was not for the enactment of the section 8A. 
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Cases such as Investec v Mutemeri, Naidoo v Absa, First Rand Bank v Evans, First Rand 
Bank v Janse van Rensburg and De Klerk v Wes Korporatief Bpk have highlighted the 
conflict between the provisions of the NCA and the Insolvency Act. The court in Ex Parte 
Ford settled the issue in respect of debt review and voluntary surrender by making it clear 
that a debtor who is over-indebted does not have a choice between using the remedy of the 
Insolvency Act by applying for the voluntary surrender of his estate or invoking provisions of 
the NCA by applying for debt review.291 Further, the case of Investec v Mutemeri, and the 
two SCA decisions in Naidoo v Absa and First Rand Ltd v Kona settled the question of 
whether an application for debt review was a bar to sequestration.292 With the current position 
as set out in these three cases, the estate of a debtor who applies for debt review is therefore 
not protected from sequestration by his creditors. Finally the court in Janse van Rensburg 
held that application for debt review did not amount to act of insolvency293 and the new 
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CHAPTER 6 
Consumer Debt Relief in Foreign Jurisdictions 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Consideration of foreign debt relief systems may prove useful in helping improve our debt 
relief system. This paper identifies three issues that require legislative intervention so as to 
provide adequate debt relief options to consumer debtors in South Africa. In earlier chapters 
of this paper it was submitted that debt relief options in South Africa are not capable of 
addressing the modern changes of consumer debtors and the credit industry. The three 
shortcomings in our consumer insolvency system which were highlighted are: the strict 
requirement of advantage to creditors; lack of discharge provisions in the two debt relief 
options other than sequestration; and lastly, debtors having no choice in the debt relief option 
they seek to use during their period of financial dilemma. Further, a creditor is not barred 
from applying for the sequestration of the estate of a debtor who has applied for, or is subject 
to, debt review.  
This chapter will discuss consumer debt relief options in the United States of America and in 
England and Wales to determine to what extent their provisions can be incorporated in our 
law to provide adequate debt relief for consumer debtors in South Africa. This chapter will 
look at how these jurisdictions have addressed the issues already identified in earlier chapters 
as being problematic in South Africa.  
The United States of America has been chosen for its unique ‘debtor-friendly’ approach in its 
debt relief options, as they are premised on the principle of affording debtors a ‘fresh start’. 
South Africa’s consumer insolvency law has been criticised on the basis of its being too 
creditor-orientated. Therefore, a glance at consumer debt relief options available for 
consumers in the United States of America may provide valuable insights into the types of 
provisions which may be included in our own consumer insolvency legislation. England and 
Wales, as a jurisdiction, has been chosen because, despite the strong Roman-Dutch roots of 
South African insolvency law, aspects of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 also reflect strong 
English law influences. Comparing the position in each jurisdiction, particularly in light of 
the changes brought about in the law in response to consumer debt problems which arose in 
the wake of global economic recessions and crises, may guide legislators in South Africa in 
relation to the introduction of revised or new statutory solutions here.                 
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6.2 United States of America 
6.2.1 Background  
The American bankruptcy laws have their origin in English law.294 Early English bankruptcy 
laws were designed to afford remedies only to creditors and punished debtors who sought 
any form of debt relief by imprisonment.295 Debtors were offered better protection with the 
enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 which extended its application not just to 
merchants and bankers, but all debtors.296 The American bankruptcy law system has been 
regarded as unique because traditionally, most bankrupt regimes in western countries, 
including South Africa, places emphasis on the advantage to creditors requirement whereas, 
the American system is premised on principle of ‘fresh start’.297 This is in order to provide 
honest debtors with an opportunity to shed their debts, thereby allowing them a fresh start.298  
In Local Loan Co v Hunt,299 the court held: 
‘the purpose of the Act has been again and again emphasized by the courts as being of 
public as well as private interest, in that it gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor 
who surrenders for distribution the property which he owns at the time of bankruptcy, 
a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the 
pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt’.300 
On October 1979, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the Bankruptcy Code) became 
effective and now regulates the American bankruptcy system.301 The Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (‘BAPCPA’) has bought extensive 
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code. These amendments were intended to curb abuse by 
debtors and create a bankruptcy system which reflected a more appropriate balance between 
the interests of creditors and debtors. 
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Having considered briefly the history of American bankruptcy and the developments to date, 
this paper will now focus on the specific debt relief options available under chapter 7 and 
chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. Chapter 7 provides for the liquidation of the estate of the 
debtor and chapter 13 provides for the adjustment of debts of an individual debtor, who has a 
regular income which he can apply to pay his debts in terms of a repayment plan.302 
6.2.2 Chapter 7 (Liquidation) 
Bankruptcy proceedings are often referred to as ‘straight’ bankruptcy or ‘liquidation’ 
bankruptcy cases.303 In theory, debtors under the chapter 7 liquidation proceedings give up all 
their property in exchange for relief in the form of a discharge from their debts.304 
Bankruptcy cases commence with the filing of a petition that may be either voluntary or 
involuntary.305 In a voluntary chapter 7 petition a debtor list his creditors and provide a 
schedule of assets, and liabilities and income and expenditure as well as other documents that 
enable creditors and the trustee to verify the accuracy of the information enclosed in the 
petition.306 
BAPCPA introduced certain new requirements that must be fulfilled before chapter 7 relief is 
granted.307 It introduced a means test and also a preliminary enquiry to establish and 
investigate whether the debtor’s income multiplied by 12, is below the median family income 
of the state in which the debtor resides.308 If it is, the debtor will not be required to undergo 
the means test.309 If the debtor’s income exceeds the median family income of his state, he is 
required to undergo the means test. Any debtor who fulfils the requirements of the means test 
of section 707 (b) (2) can file for bankruptcy. If the debtor does not meet the requirements of 
the means test, this would result in the court dismissing the petition under this chapter. 
The commencement of chapter 7 proceedings results in the automatic creation of an estate as 
set out in section 541 of the Code.310 In terms of section 362 of the Code, the filing of a 
bankruptcy petition also imposes an automatic stay, barring all civil actions involving the 
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debtor and his property.311 The automatic stay is a prominent feature in the Bankruptcy Code, 
protecting the debtor against certain actions by the creditor, most importantly precluding 
creditors from instituting all judicial and administrative proceedings as well as most informal 
actions a creditor might take in an effort to collect.312 The automatic stay is not permanent 
and ends when the bankruptcy case cease.313 
 
At the end of the case, the debtor receives a fresh start.314 The Bankruptcy Code contains a 
number of discharge rules each depending on the type of bankruptcy proceeding involved.315 
The significance of discharge is that a debtor is released and is no longer liable to pay pre-
petition debts.316 In certain circumstances a debtor will not receive a discharge this include 
where inter alia, the debtor is not an individual; the debtor, with intent to hinder, delay, or 
defraud a creditor or an officer of the estate has transferred, removed, destroyed, or concealed 
or has permitted to be transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed- property of 
the debtor, within one year before the date of the filing of the petition; or property of the 
estate, after the date of the filing of the petition.317 Debts such as tax debts; debts fraudulently 
incurred; unscheduled debts; family obligations; and wilful and malicious injury are not 
discharged.318 
6.2.3 Chapter 13 (Repayment plan) 
Chapter 13 is an alternative to bankruptcy in the form of a repayment plan. A chapter 13 
bankruptcy petition may be filed by the debtor himself or by the debtor and his spouse. In 
order to be eligible for filing under chapter 13 the debtor must have a stable source of income 
and have debt liability not exceeding $1,149,525 in secured claims and $383,175 in 
unsecured claims.319 Chapter 13 plans have three essential provisions. Section 109 of the 
Code requires that the plan: 
(a) ‘shall provide for the submission of all or such portion of future earnings or other future 
income of the debtor to the supervision and control of the trustee as is necessary for the 
execution of the plan; 
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(b) shall provide for the full payment, in deferred cash payments, of all claims entitled to 
priority under the section; and 
(c) if the plan classifies claims, shall provide the same treatment for each claim within a 
particular class.’320 
Creditors in the chapter 13 plan do not participate nor vote on whether to accept the plan, the 
debtor is the only one with the right to submit a plan.321 In most instances a debtor files his 
plan simultaneously with his petition.322 The plan is filed 15 days after the petition and in 
addition, a debtor must file various documents, including schedules of assets and liabilities, a 
statement of the current income and expenditures, and a statement of affairs.323 The debtor is 
required to commence making payments pursuant to the plan not later than 30 days after the 
date of filing of the plan, or the order for relief, whichever is earlier, unless the court orders 
otherwise.324 
In chapter 13 cases, the debtor pays his future income to a trustee for three to five years and 
the trustee thereafter distributes it to creditors pursuant to the court-approved payment 
plan.325 Once the chapter 13 plan is confirmed, it binds the debtor and all creditors.326 The 
debtor must be able to abide by the plan.327 The debtor may modify the plan at any time 
before it is confirmed provided it still meets the requirements of the section.328  
If a debtor is not eligible for chapter 13 as a result of having too much disposable income, he 
cannot be compelled to file to file a petition under chapter 7.329 A debtor may convert his case 
voluntarily from chapter 13 to chapter 7 and a waiver of this right is null and void.330 In 
certain circumstances such as: when a debtor fails to make payments under the confirmed 
plan; there is an unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors; and failure 
to file a plan timeously, the court, can convert the case to liquidation under chapter 7 or may 
dismiss the case under chapter 13, whichever is in the best interests of creditors and the 
estate.331 
                                                          
320 S 1322 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
321 Ferriel and Janger (note 303 above) 648. 
322 Ferriel and Janger (note 303 above) 643. 
323  S 1322 Bankruptcy Code. 
324 S 1322 of the Bankruptcy Code 1326. 
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Section 362 (a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a petition filed under any debt relief 
chapter of the Code stays any judicial and administrative actions by the creditor. Automatic 
stay is one effect of chapter 13 and the debtor may get to keep his home. Another effect of 
chapter 13 is discharge. Unlike chapter 7, the scope of discharge under chapter 13 depends on 
whether the debtor successfully completes his plan.332 The Congress gives an incentive to 
debtors who choose chapter 13 over chapter 7 in a form of broader discharge upon the 
completion of a chapter 13 plan.333 Section 1328 of the Code discharges all debts owed by the 
debtors except for the following: long terms debts; which are claims on which the latest 
payment is due after the due date for the final payment under the plan; tax debts; debts 
incurred through fraud; student loans; and criminal restitution orders or fines.334 In addition, 
section 1328 precludes a debtor from receiving a discharge if the debtor has been discharged 
previously under chapter 7, 11, or 12 in a bankruptcy case filed within four years preceding 
the date of the order for relief under chapter 13.335 It may be noted that the bankruptcy laws 
in America make no provisions for debt relief orders for consumer debtors with no income 
and no assets (NINA). 
 
6.3 England and Wales 
6.3.1 Background  
Originally, bankruptcy laws in England were extremely pro-creditor. Consumer debtors, who 
became insolvent, could claim no relief from the common law. Procedures to enforce 
payment of debts through seizure and imprisonment of the debtor as well the sale of their 
property applied even to those debtors who were honest but became insolvent through 
misfortune.336 In the 19th century England introduced a series of bankruptcy legislation which 
laid the foundation of the modern law of bankruptcy, as we know it today.337 During this 
period England experienced a lot of changes in their bankruptcy laws and the coming into 
effect of the Bankruptcy Act 1883, afforded the law of personal insolvency which is still 
recognisable today.338 
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336 Fletcher (note 13 above) 10. 
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The consumer insolvency law in England and Wales offers two debt relief options for 
consumer debtors. These debt options are divided into formal options which are under the 
Insolvency Act 1986, and informal options available which are non-statutory.339 The coming 
into effect of the Enterprise Act 2002 has resulted in the insolvency system in England and 
Wales being categorised as debtor friendly.340 The paper will only discuss the formal 
statutory debt relief options available to consumer debtors in England and Wales. The options 
include the Bankruptcy process, individual voluntary arrangements (IVAs), court county 




Bankruptcy is regulated by the provisions in Part IX of the Insolvency Act 1986. Section 264 
of the Insolvency Act 1986 lists those who can bring a petition of bankruptcy against an 
individual.  The list includes: 
(i) individual creditors;  
(ii)  the debtor himself; 
(iii) the temporary administrator; 
(iv) the supervisor of, or any person other than the individual who is for the time 
being bound by a voluntary arrangement proposed by the individual and 
approved under Part VIII; and 
(v)  the Official Petitioner or any person specified in the order.341  
 
The requirements to present a petition for Bankruptcy are set out in section 265 of the 
Insolvency Act 1986 and, inter alia, require a debtor to be domiciled in England and Wales 
and to be present in England and Wales when the petition is presented.342 The bankruptcy 
order stays individual enforcement by creditors against the debtor and prevents a debtor from 
creditor harassment. At the expiration of the bankruptcy period the debtor receives discharge 
as provided for in section 279 of the Insolvency Act 1986. The Enterprise Act 2002 provides 
for debtors entering bankruptcy to have their debts automatically discharged after one year, 
                                                          
339 Walters, ‘Individual Voluntary Arrangements: A Fresh Start for Salaried Consumer Debtors in England and 
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rather than three years under the old regime, and it allows for an earlier discharge where the 
Official Receiver deems fit.343 Bankruptcy may seem like a better option due to the provision 
for discharge, however, it does have some adverse effect on individual debtors, such as, that 
homeowners may lose their homes, the cost of filing for bankruptcy is normally high, and 
when accessing credit, a bankrupt will have to disclose his status.344 
 
6.3.3 Individual Voluntary Arrangement (IVAs) 
Individual voluntary arrangements (IVAs) are the main formal alternative to bankruptcy.345 
Part VIII of the Insolvency Act regulates IVA. An IVA commences where a debtor who 
wishes to achieve a resettlement of his debts makes a proposal to his creditors. Section 258 
provides that a creditors' meeting summoned under section 257 shall decide whether to 
approve or reject the proposed voluntary arrangement.346 In the payment of his debts, the 
debtor can agree to contribute assets or surplus income or a combination of both.347 An IVA 
binds the debtor and his creditors on the terms of the agreement.348 Where a debtor has 
complied with the terms of the IVA he receives a discharge from all unsecured debts that 
were outstanding at the commencement of the IVA.349  
 
Importantly, an IVA or an application thereof stays a bankruptcy petition, execution or other 
legal process that may be commenced or continued against the debtor or his property except 
with the leave of the court.350  In certain circumstances, the court has discretion to make a 
bankruptcy order under a petition where inter alia: the debtor fails to comply with his 
obligations under the IVA plan; the information given by the debtor was false or certain 
material information was omitted; or the debtor has failed to fulfil his obligations as required 
by the supervisor of the IVA plan.351 IVAs are often proposed by a debtor who seeks to avoid 
bankruptcy and one of the advantages of an IVA over bankruptcy is that a debtor may keep 
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his home.352 However, in recent years IVAs have been criticised for having a protracted 
completion time period, ranging from an average of five and a half years. 
 
6.3.4 County Court Administration Orders (CCAOs) 
 A CCAO is a court-based debt management solution that was introduced to facilitate the 
recovery of small debts and is designed to assist debtors with relatively small income and 
limited assets.353 CCAOs are only available to debtors with debts not exceeding £5,000 and 
with not more than one judgment debt. According to section 112J of the County Courts Act 
1984, only a court can make an administration order on the strength of the application made 
by the debtor.354 Section 112 (6) of the Act provides that an administration order allows a 
debtor to make payment of the debt either in instalments, or in full, depending on his 
circumstances.355 If the debtor pays his debts in full in terms of the order, the remaining 
balance of the debts may be discharged in terms of section 117 of the County Courts Act.356 
The administration order is not designed to last indefinitely. Section 112K of the Act states 
that the maximum period permitted is five years. However, this is subject to any variation or 
revocation of the order.357 
An administrations order does not co-exist with other debt management arrangements and 
other debt relief options cease to be in force when an administration order is made.358 
Administration orders also stay all legal proceedings. Once an administration order has been 
made, no creditor will have any remedy against the person or property of the debtor in respect 
of any debt of which the debtor notified the court before the administration order was made 
or which has been scheduled to the order.359 Administration orders also freeze charges and 
interest.360 The disadvantage of this debt relief option is that it has a low completion rate and, 
as a result, in practice only few debtors ultimately receive a discharge.361 
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6.3.5 Debt Relief Orders (DROs) 
Debt relief options for debtors with no income and assets became effective on the 6th of April 
2009 and were inserted into the Insolvency Act 1986 through the Tribunals, Courts and 
Enforcement Act 2007.362 A qualifying debtor has a total liabilities of less than £15 000; a 
maximum surplus income of £50 per month after paying normal household expenses; and 
assets of no more than £300. If the debtor owns a motor vehicle, it may not be worth more 
than £1 000.363 The above requirements of the DRO have been criticised for being too rigid. 
Although this debt relief option was introduced to come to the aid of the low income and low 
assets debtors, its requirements are said to be ‘unnecessarily restrictive and unjustifiable’.364 
 
This debt relief option is extra-judicial and courts play no role whatsoever in the process. The 
official receiver makes the order and once this has occurred, there is a moratorium placed on 
all debts owed by the debtor and a creditor cannot commence bankruptcy proceedings.365 
During this moratorium period a debtor is subject to the same restrictions as bankruptcy.366 
The moratorium will endure for a year and thereafter the debtor receives a discharge.367  
 
6.4 Comparative Comments 
Following comments are made with focus on three aspects of consumer insolvency in South 
Africa which remain areas of concern, as identified in earlier chapters. Neither the United 
States of America nor England and Wales employs a requirement of ‘advantage to creditors’ 
in their consumer insolvency law system. This requirement has remained an important feature 
in the South African’s consumer insolvency system and has met with a great deal of criticism 
from writers of this area of law. 
 
In the United States of America, BAPCPA introduced a means test which determines which 
debt relief option is appropriate for each debtor, taking into account his unique 
circumstances.368 The means test is not a blanket rule as it is only applied where the debtor’s 
                                                          
362 Roestoff and Coetzee, ‘Consumer Debt Relief in South Africa; Lessons from America and England; and 
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363 Roestoff and Coetzee (note 362 above) 73. 
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gross income exceeds the median income in his state of residence.369 In such a case, where 
his disposable monthly income is more than the amount allowed, he does not qualify to file 
for chapter 7. On the other hand, in South Africa the determining factor for a debtor who is 
applying for voluntary surrender and in compulsory sequestration is whether sequestration 
will yield an advantage to creditors. It is evident that the former enquiry, using a means test, 
is more focused on the debtor and the latter leans more towards the benefit of the creditors. 
Thus we can see the different approach adopted by these two jurisdictions. 
 
Secondly, the consumer insolvency regime in South Africa can be distinguished from the US 
system on the basis of the absence of the fresh start principle in our system. A debtor may 
only receive a discharge when his estate is sequestrated. Further, such discharge is a 
consequence of sequestration and not the primary objective of our insolvency law.370 
Alternatives to sequestration, namely, debt review and administration orders do not provide 
for a discharge and therefore debtors will not receive a fresh start.371 Clearly, the American 
bankruptcy regime’s policies and principles are more liberal and debtor friendly, compared to 
the South Africa’s consumer insolvency law system which is creditor oriented.372 
Discharging the debtor from his pre-petition debts is a feature in both chapters 7 and 13 of the 
Bankruptcy Code which provide for liquidation and a repayment plan respectively. In South 
Africa, discharge only occurs as a consequence of rehabilitation in terms of the Insolvency 
Act. 
 
Thirdly, the debt relief options available to debtors in the United States of America allow for 
an automatic stay in relation to any proceedings against a debtor and creditors are therefore   
precluded from instituting proceedings against a debtor and his property.373 However, in 
certain circumstances bankruptcy proceedings under chapter 7 can be bought while a debtor 
is subject to chapter 13.374 In South Africa, a debtor’s resorting to one of the debt relief 
options that serve as alternative to sequestration does not preclude a creditor from instituting 
sequestration proceedings against the estate of his debtor.375 In the result, even if a debtor 
would prefer to retain his assets keep and does have a regular income to make payments in 
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terms of a debt re-arrangement plan under the NCA or an administration order under section 
74 of the MCA, the court may grant a sequestration order against his estate. This is an 
unfortunate state of affairs for consumer debtors in South Africa. Steyn comments that it is a 
great concern that the consumer insolvency procedure by the Insolvency Act and the other 
debt relief options do not conform to internationally recognised principles and 
recommendations in relation to rehabilitation procedures.376 The INSOL Consumer Debt 
Report examines the principles in which the consumer insolvency law should be based and 
recommends that such principles be equally applicable to all jurisdictions.377 The principles 
in the INSOL report, recommend inter alia that a debtor receive some form of discharge from 
indebtedness and or be offered a ‘fresh start’ and a debtor be given the opportunity to choose 
between a liquidation procedure or rehabilitation procedure.378 The INSOL report also 
recommends that creditors be precluded from going after the debtor who is subject to any 
debt re-arrangement or restructuring.379 The consumer insolvency systems of the two 
jurisdictions that have discussed appear to be in line with most of international principles and 
recommendations of the INSOL report. 
 
As stated in this paper, South Africa’s debt relief options lack fundamental aspects including 
the lack of provisions for discharge which is evident in other jurisdictions. Therefore, a 
debtor in South Africa may be indebted for the rest of his life with no possibility of being 
discharged. In England and Wales there are a variety of debt relief options which cater for a 
range of debtors depending on their level of indebtedness and such options have discharge 
provisions380 Although there is such variety in England and Wales, their debt relief options 
have been criticised for being complicated and not giving many debtors that opportunity of a 
‘fresh start’.381  
 
Although, there has been criticism on the debt relief options in England and Wales, there are 
still positive aspects as compared to the insolvency system in South Africa. The statutory 
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debt relief options in England and Wales, unlike South Africa provide for an automatic stay 
in all legal proceedings against a debtor whose debts are being restructured under the IVAs or 
the CCAOs. Creditors cannot petition for the debtor’s bankruptcy or bring any claim against 
the debtor except with the leave of court. In South Africa, however, the position is 
remarkably different. Until recently, a debtor who applied for any of the two debt relief 
options was deemed to have committed an act of insolvency and as a result a creditor could 
apply for the sequestration of the debtor’s estate. This issue has now been resolved by the 
enactment of the new section 8A of the Insolvency Act, however, section 8A applies only to a 
debtor who applies for debt review and a debtor who applies for an administration order is 
not protected.382  Further, a debtor who is subject to debt review or administration is not 
protected from a creditor who wishes to apply for the sequestration of his estate. The 
decisions in Naidoo v Absa and Investec v Mutemeri have confirmed this position in our 
law.383 
 
6.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has set out and discussed the debt relief systems in the United States of America 
and England and Wales in order to highlight differences with a view to determining how their 
provisions can be adopted into our own system to provide adequate debt relief options for our 
consumer debtors.  In the United States of America the provisions are more debtor-friendly 
and the requirements for ‘straight bankruptcy’ under chapter 7 are not as stringent as 
compared to our ‘advantage to creditors’ requirement. Further, the repayment plan under 
chapter 13 is also debtor-friendly and both chapter 7 and 13 contain provisions that allow 
debtors to be discharged at the end. The same may be said with regard to the debt relief 
options available in England and Wales. The provisions are more debtor-friendly and, in 
England and Wales, a debtor may be discharged after only one year in the bankruptcy 
proceedings. However, the IVAs have been criticised for their long completion period which 
takes as long as six to seven years for a debtor to complete the plan.384 This is seen as a 
concern in respect of a debtor’s rehabilitation and the fresh start policy. The same concern 
has been raised in respect of DROs as it has been said the requirements for this debt relief are 
similarly stringent as those on bankruptcy.385  
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A common thread  in the United States of America and in England and Wales is the barring 
of any proceedings instituted against a debtor who has applied for any statutory debt relief 
option that is not in the form of ‘straight bankruptcy’. A significant difference, when 
comparing debt relief options available to debtors in South Africa and those available in the 
United States of America and in England and Wales, is that South Africa remains a pro-
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7.1 Conclusion 
This dissertation has provided an overview of the insolvency law in South Africa as well as 
other debt relief options that are available for a consumer debtor who is experiencing 
financial problems. In our current consumer insolvency law regime an over-indebted debtor 
may either elect to utilise the machinery of the Insolvency Act, provided that he can satisfy 
the advantage to creditors requirement, or alternatively apply for debt review under the NCA 
or an administration order in terms of the MCA. 
 
It has already been established that sequestration is not a debt relief option available to every 
debtor and this is largely due to the requirement to prove advantage to creditors.386 Further, 
the discretionary power exercised by the courts when adjudicating on applications for 
sequestration, especially voluntary surrender, is also a significant factor as regards whether a 
debtor is able to use this machinery or not. In Ex Parte Ford, it was evident how reluctant 
courts are to grant voluntary surrender orders. This case also showed evidence of the creditor- 
oriented approach adopted by our courts. Thus it is clear that our insolvency system and our 
courts protect the interests of the creditors more than those of the debtors.  
 
A further challenge for debtors who are unable to satisfy the stringent requirements of the 
Insolvency Act is that even the alternatives to sequestration are also creditor friendly. The 
objectives of the NCA make it clear that a debtor must fulfil his financial obligations wholly 
and not partially.387 Similarly, administration orders are also creditor oriented because a 
debtor is required to make payments under the administration order until he has satisfied all 
his debts.388 
 
The creditor oriented approach yields a further result: the issue of lack of provision for 
debtors to receive discharge under debt review or on an administration order. The Insolvency 
Act is the only debt relief option that provides for discharge. However, it may be noted that 
discharge is a consequence of sequestration and not the primary objective of the Insolvency 
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Act.389 As stated earlier in the paper neither debt review nor administration orders offer 
discharge to debtors subject to their completion of their repayment plan. The lack of such 
provision may result in debtors being indebted for the rest of their lives. This is an adverse 
position that any debtor may find himself in and many authors concur that South African’s 
consumer insolvency law requires reform.390 
 
The comparative section in this paper brought in the spotlight that both the United States of 
America and England and Wales have more debtor friendly consumer insolvency law 
systems. Particularly the United States of America’s insolvency system is underpinned by the 
principle of ‘fresh start’, which is designed to discharge honest debtors. England and Wales 
similarly has debtor friendly provisions, although some shortfalls have been identified in the 
IVAs and DROs, the insolvency in these two jurisdictions remain more debt friendly than 
that of South Africa.  The international principles of insolvency also advocate that debtors 
receive a discharge from their financial obligations after a certain period.391  Further, these 
principles recommend that a consumer insolvency system must allow debtors to choose 
between a liquidation procedure and rehabilitation procedure which include restructuring 
procedure.392 These principles recommend that creditors be prohibited from pursuing the 
debtor during any liquidation and rehabilitation procedure.393 Contrary to this, our courts 
have set a precedent that goes against most of these international principles. Although the 
new section 8A of the Insolvency Act now prevents a creditor from applying for the 
sequestration of his debtor’s estate, where the debtor has applied for debt review, a debtor 
who is subject to an administration order  is not protected from a creditor who wants to 
sequestrate his estate.   
 
It may be concluded that our law is not consonant with these international principles as our 
alternative debt relief options do not protect a debtor from having his estate sequestrated. A 
debtor who wishes to retain his assets and apply for debt review, in lieu of liquidation as a 
consequence of sequestration, may end up losing the very assets he is trying to protect.  From 
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the discussion of the two foreign jurisdictions selected, it appears that both of them allow for 
automatic stay and no creditor may go against the debtor or his property.  Thus a debtor’s 
home and property is protected during the subsistence of any debt restructuring plan. 
 
7.2 Recommendations 
It is acknowledged that South Africa’s consumer insolvency does not provide adequate debt 
relief for debtors and that reform is required to address the shortcomings in our system.394 
Therefore, there is a need for legislative intervention in order to bring South Africa’s 
consumer insolvency regime in line with international principles and to make it consonant 
with the approach followed by other foreign jurisdictions. Although the legislature has 
attempted to provide a solution on the conflict between the Insolvency Act and the NCA by 
enacting section 8A, this appears not be adequate, as the new section 8A only covers debtor 
who applies for debt review not administration order. It is thus recommended that the 
legislature intervene and adopt ideas from foreign jurisdictions to address some of the 
shortcomings experienced by our own insolvency system. The legislative intervention could 
either be in a form of amending the existing legislation or enacting new legislation.395 It is 
recommended that when the legislature adopt ideas from foreign jurisdictions, be mindful of 
our unique demographics, history and socio economic differences.396  
 
First, it is recommended that the current provisions of both the NCA and the Insolvency Act 
be amended to preclude a creditor from applying for the sequestration of his debtor’s estate, 
where the debtor has applied for, or is subject to, debt review. We have seen evidence that the 
modern trend is to stay legal actions including sequestration against debtors who are subject 
to restructuring or repayment plans. It is recommended that the legislature amend or enact 
provisions similar to those of the United States of America and of England and Wales, which 
will create an automatic stay on any proceedings including sequestration, against the debtor 
by the creditor. The automatic stay should be effective from the time the debtor makes an 
application for the re-arrangement of his debts and there should be a regulated body that will 
work with debt counsellors and administrators to expedite the process since there is a risk of 
having a backlog.   
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Secondly, it is recommended that the NCA and section 74 of the MCA be amended to allow 
debtors to receive discharge after a certain period. As it stands, there is no incentive for 
debtors, particularly honest ones who become over-indebted through the misfortunes of life, 
to enter into these repayment plans. Further, the abuse of process in insolvency proceedings 
as evidenced by the case law may be attributed to the fact that there is no other debt relief 
option that offers a debtor a discharge from his pre-sequestration debts.397 It then follows that 
debtors see insolvency as their only way out. It is recommended that the debt relief options be 
revised in order be in line with the international principles so as to offer discharge to a debtor 
who undergoes any debt restructuring plan. 
 
Thirdly, it is recommended that the advantage to creditors requirement be done away with 
and/or the alternatives to sequestration be amended to have more debtor friendly provisions. 
In this way debtors who cannot satisfy the requirement may still find relief using the 
alternative statutory measures available. Therefore, it is recommended that the legislature 
amend or enact new provisions that will be more debtor friendly ones which will offer a 
‘fresh start’ to debtors. The advantage to creditors requirement is an old principle 
underpinning the Insolvency Act and thus reviewing this principle, to examine if it still has a 
place in the modern consumer insolvency regime, would prove to be a worthy exercise. 
Evans rightfully submitted that courts have an inherent discretion to prevent abuse of its 
process.398 Thus if the advantage to creditors requirement is done away with, courts will still 
have the discretion to refuse a sequestration application on the ground that it appears prima 
facie to be an abuse of court process or is not instituted bona fide.  
 
It is recommended that in order for the Insolvency Act to be available to every debtor even 
the indigent one. The yardstick should no longer be one that is to the advantage of creditors 
but be the one that balances the interests of both the debtors and creditors. The recommended 
approach is that, instead of a debtor showing the court that the sequestration will be to the 
advantage to creditors, the court must look at the application based on its own facts and 
circumstances and make findings on whether such an application balances the interests of the 
creditors and those of the debtors. If the sequestration will benefit both the debtor and the 
creditors and it is not an abuse of the process the court should grant the order. If however, the 
sequestration application will not benefit both the debtor and his creditors, the court may 
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refer the matter to be dealt with by debt review or section 74 of the MCA. It is recommended 
that this approach be applied to both voluntary surrender and compulsory sequestration. If the 
application is an abuse of process the court should not grant the sequestration order nor 
should the court refer the matter.  
 
Internationally, insolvency law has shifted towards a more debtor friendly approach and 
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